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The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice interpret the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) using 
several formats, but Treasury regulations are by far the most 
prominent and carry the greatest legal weight.1 Identifying the 
proper standard for evaluating Treasury regulations that in-
terpret the Code should be easy: Treasury regulations are enti-
tled to Chevron deference. Yet more than twenty years after the 
Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,2 the question of judicial deference 
toward Treasury regulations remains stubbornly unresolved. 
The circuits are split and scholars are divided over whether 
Chevron deference or some other evaluative standard should 
apply to judicial review of Treasury regulations.3 The Seventh 
Circuit, quite rightly, has labeled this “seemingly simple” issue 
a “free-fire zone” and a “melee.”4 
In its more recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp., 
the Court offered a new test aimed at resolving long-standing 
disagreements over when Chevron deference should apply.5 
Mead makes clear that Chevron deference is warranted only for 
agency interpretations promulgated through the exercise of 
congressionally delegated authority to bind regulated parties 
with the force of law.6 Since there is no question that Treasury 
regulations are legally binding upon taxpayers and the gov-
ernment alike, to the extent that there was real doubt before 
 
 1. See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDI-
VIDUALS ¶ 46.01[3] (3d ed. 2002) (recognizing Treasury regulations as the 
most authoritative administrative guidance issued by the Treasury Depart-
ment and the Internal Revenue Service); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE ¶ 3.01 (2d ed. 2002) (same). 
 2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 3. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm’r, 245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) (ac-
knowledging the split); Cent. Pa. Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 384, 390–92 
(1995) (noting Chevron’s “checkered career in the tax arena”); Noël B. Cun-
ningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 
41–50 (2004) (summarizing the disagreement). 
 4. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 977–78 (7th 
Cir. 1998). 
 5. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). As the sole dissenter from Mead, Justice 
Scalia described the Court’s decision as “one of the most significant opinions 
ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative 
action.” Id. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 6. Id. at 226–27 (majority opinion). 
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Mead whether Treasury regulations are entitled to Chevron 
deference, the Mead inquiry should easily resolve the issue.7 
Yet the post-Mead scholarship and jurisprudence continues to 
avoid that straight-forward conclusion. 
Settling the question of deference toward Treasury regula-
tions carries significant implications for both tax jurisprudence 
and tax policy. Chevron deference is premised on assumptions 
about congressional delegations of primary interpretive author-
ity.8 Such delegations in turn reflect a presumptive evaluation 
that independent and executive branch agencies, rather than 
the courts, should be responsible for the policy choices inherent 
in statutory interpretation.9 Treasury officials are more democ-
ratically accountable, are better positioned to respond through 
regulations to changes in taxpayer behavior and tax policy 
trends, and possess significantly more expertise over the com-
plexities of the tax laws than most judges.10 Yet the conse-
quence of less judicial deference to Treasury regulations is 
greater judicial intervention in tax policy. Allowing judges to 
 
 7. But see William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory 
Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 719 (2002) (describing Mead’s test as “a cumbersome, 
unworkable regime under which courts must draw increasingly fine distinc-
tions using impossibly vague standards”); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: 
Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 353–58 (2003) (criticizing 
Mead as overly abstract, “producing a great deal of confusion and error”). 
 8. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. 
Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005) (noting a delegation premise); Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 
(same); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-
Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 812 (2002) (“At the most 
general level, Mead eliminates any doubt that Chevron deference is grounded 
in congressional intent.”). 
 9. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 865–66 (1984) (emphasizing the reasons for delegation). But see infra note 
278 and accompanying text (noting the fictionality of this presumption). 
 10. A small number of lower court judges have extensive tax expertise. 
The United States Tax Court, an Article I court, specializes in and handles 
only tax matters, and most tax cases are brought before this court. See I.R.C. 
§ 7442 (2000) (establishing Tax Court jurisdiction); BITTKER, supra note 1, 
¶ 51.03[1] (discussing Tax Court history and jurisdiction). The Tax Court’s de-
cisions, and particularly its legal interpretations, are reviewable by the gener-
alist circuit courts of appeals and the United States Supreme Court, however. 
See I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1) (2000) (providing for appellate review of Tax Court de-
cisions); BITTKER, supra note 1, ¶ 51.07 (summarizing appellate review of Tax 
Court decisions). Tax refund claims are also included within the comparatively 
limited subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, another Ar-
ticle I court, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Judges on these 
courts are not necessarily tax specialists, either. See BITTKER, supra note 1, 
¶ 51.08. 
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second-guess Treasury’s interpretive choices increases the inci-
dence of like taxpayers not being treated alike, as circuits split 
and Treasury’s ability to resolve interpretive issues is ham-
pered by stare decisis. Congressional preference aside, these 
factors represent powerful normative arguments in favor of 
Chevron deference for Treasury regulations. 
Several prominent tax scholars and practitioners have 
written thoroughly and eloquently against applying Chevron 
deference to at least some, if not all, Treasury regulations.11 
Doctrinally, the arguments against applying Chevron to Treas-
ury regulations draw principally from a belief that the tax area 
has its own, unique deference tradition represented principally 
by the Court’s pre-Chevron opinion in National Muffler Dealers 
Association v. Commissioner.12 The normative arguments 
against Chevron deference for Treasury regulations likewise 
rely on various assertions that “tax is different” to support 
greater judicial involvement in interpreting the Code. 
To some extent, these scholarly efforts reflect varying con-
ceptions of what Chevron is and does. Of course different un-
derstandings of Chevron will yield disparate opinions as to how 
the Chevron doctrine should apply in the tax context. Yet that 
aspect of the existing scholarship merely reflects the more gen-
eral scholarly disagreement over Chevron’s meaning. Where 
tax scholars and practitioners addressing the issue of tax defer-
ence are fairly consistent is in their insistence that when it 
comes to Chevron, tax is special and should be treated differ-
ently from other areas of administrative law. 
The framework articulated in Chevron and Mead has many 
critics.13 Nevertheless, the deference model offered by these 
cases represents the present administrative law norm. This fact 
alone does not necessitate cross-disciplinary uniformity. The 
 
 11. See infra Part I.D (summarizing the existing scholarship). 
 12. 440 U.S. 472, 484–87 (1979). 
 13. See, e.g., Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of 
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (calling 
Chevron “a siren’s song, seductive but treacherous” for the “fundamental al-
terations it makes in our constitutional conception of the administrative 
state”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative 
State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Struc-
tural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 68–81 (2000) (suggesting that Chevron defer-
ence undermines the judicial role in our constitutional structure); Cass Sun-
stein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
445–46 (1989) (stating that Chevron confuses ambiguity with delegation and 
contravenes established separation of powers principles). 
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courts should be open to deviating from legal norms where cir-
cumstances justify departure. Ernest Gellhorn and Glen Robin-
son notoriously decried “the tendency of administrative law to 
examine the process of judicial review without reference to the 
substantive content of the agency action being reviewed.”14 
Mead itself requires a statute-by-statute, agency-by-agency 
evaluation of Chevron’s applicability. The courts should not re-
ject legal norms simply for the sake of doing so, however. De-
viation should be premised only on clear justification; such jus-
tification should be context-specific, not a mere rehashing of 
the general criticism of the norm. 
Yet the emphasis of the existing scholarship on the 
uniqueness of the tax field—and the resulting complexity that 
this focus has added to what otherwise should be a fairly sim-
ple analysis—are emblematic of a perception of tax exceptional-
ism that intrudes upon much contemporary tax scholarship and 
jurisprudence.15 The view that tax is different or special cre-
ates, among other problems, a cloistering effect that too often 
leads practitioners, scholars, and courts considering tax issues 
to misconstrue or disregard otherwise interesting and relevant 
developments in non-tax areas, even when the questions in-
volved are not particularly unique to tax.16 The ongoing debate 
over judicial deference toward tax regulations offers an espe-
cially frustrating example of this tax exceptionalism at work. 
A few scholars have suggested that, perhaps, Chevron and 
National Muffler can be reconciled in favor of Chevron defer-
ence for Treasury regulations.17 Others have lamented the ten-
dency of tax scholars and practitioners to ignore the broader le-
gal universe in evaluating tax issues, including the deference 
question.18 To date, however, no one has squarely refuted the 
exceptionalist claims about the uniqueness of tax deference 
 
 14. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative 
Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 783 (1975); see also John F. Coverdale, Court Re-
view of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 35, 35 (1995) (quoting same).  
 15. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow 
Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 531 (1994) (discussing this phe-
nomenon). 
 16. See id. at 518–19. 
 17. See David A. Brennen, Treasury Regulations and Judicial Deference in 
the Post-Chevron Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 428–30 (1997) (attempting to 
reconcile the Court’s post-Chevron tax jurisprudence with Chevron); Cunning-
ham & Repetti, supra note 3, at 47–53 (equating Chevron’s analysis with that 
of National Muffler and applying Chevron to anti-abuse Treasury regulations). 
 18. See Caron, supra note 15, at 518, 531–36. 
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traditions and practices and the resulting case against Chevron 
deference toward Treasury regulations. This Article fills that 
void in the literature and explains why the more straight-
forward conclusion of Chevron deference for Treasury regula-
tions really is the right one, despite previous scholarly and ju-
dicial efforts to complicate the matter. More broadly, however, 
the Article debunks the perception of tax exceptionalism that, I 
believe, is the primary reason why the issue of Chevron defer-
ence for tax regulations continues to be so thorny. 
My argument is a comparative one, laying tax and non-tax 
jurisprudence, scholarship, and regulatory practice side by side 
to show that tax does not have, has never had, and should not 
have its own unique deference tradition. National Muffler of-
fers nothing more than a particularly clear articulation of the 
Court’s pre-Chevron approach toward a broad category of 
agency actions that included, but was not limited to, most 
Treasury regulations. Chevron and Mead clearly extend the 
applicability of strong, mandatory judicial deference to encom-
pass that group of comparable agency actions in other adminis-
trative law contexts; so the courts should apply that same 
standard to Treasury regulations as well. The normative case is 
similar, as a comparison of tax and non-tax case law and prac-
tices shows that tax has more in common with other complex 
regulatory areas where Chevron clearly applies than tax law-
yers tend to recognize. 
Part I of this Article will briefly summarize the Chev-
ron/Mead framework, the allegedly competing National Muffler 
standard, and the ongoing debate over the relationship between 
the two. Part II will articulate the case against tax exceptional-
ism in judicial deference. Part II.A. will establish the tax defer-
ence tradition as well within the larger context of more general 
administrative law jurisprudence and scholarship from the 
early days of the Internal Revenue Code to the present; and 
Part II.B will similarly compare tax and non-tax cases and 
practices to refute various normative arguments raised to jus-
tify a different deference standard in the tax context. Part III of 
this Article will then apply Mead’s two-part test to illustrate 
that Treasury regulations are entitled to Chevron deference. 
I.  DUELING DEFERENCE STANDARDS 
Underlying the argument against judicial deference toward 
Treasury regulations is a certain degree of hostility toward 
Chevron that is not limited to tax scholars and practitioners. 
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Many critics of Chevron generally are wary of agency authority 
absent strong judicial oversight;19 and many in the tax commu-
nity regard Treasury’s authority over the Code absent strong 
judicial oversight with similar misgiving.20 Given Chevron’s 
dominance in other areas of administrative law, it is to be ex-
pected that those with such concerns might argue in favor of 
carving out an exception for tax cases. The question is whether 
there is a case for doing so. 
The tax-specific argument against judicial deference to-
ward Treasury regulations flows from a combination of termi-
nology and tradition. As with most government agencies, 
Treasury and the IRS are bound to follow the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).21 The APA requires agencies promulgat-
ing regulations to follow public notice and comment procedures 
in developing certain types of regulations unless one of several 
listed exceptions applies.22 Drawing from pre-APA terminology, 
regulations for which the APA requires notice and comment are 
called “legislative” rules, while one of the exceptions from the 
notice and comment requirements is for so-called “interpreta-
tive rules,” also known by the minimally shorter “interpretive 
rules.”23 
 
 19. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal 
Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the 
Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 165, 182 (1992) (advocating 
“aggressive judicial review of agency rule-making” to ameliorate separation of 
powers concerns); Farina, supra note 13, at 452–53 (criticizing Chevron as ex-
acerbating an imbalance in federal separation of powers); Sunstein, supra note 
13, at 446 (calling for a “firm judicial hand in the interpretation of statutes”). 
 20. See, e.g., Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731, 758 (2002) (expressing concerns about anti-
taxpayer bias); Irving Salem et al., ABA Section on Taxation: Report of the 
Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 724–25 (2004) (raising 
questions about IRS motivations and willingness to push statutory bounda-
ries). 
 21. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is a statute passed by Con-
gress in 1946 that mandates procedures for different formats of federal gov-
ernmental agency action, including the promulgation of regulations, or “rules” 
in APA terminology. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2000). 
 22. See id. § 553(b). 
 23. See id. § 551. The APA itself does not use the legislative term to de-
scribe rules subject to the notice and comment requirements. However, expla-
nations of APA provisions and both pre- and post-APA literature and jurispru-
dence use the term in distinguishing such rules from interpretative rules. See 
1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.1, at 305 (4th 
ed. 2002); Robert C. Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 
54 HARV. L. REV. 377, 384–85 (1941); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative 
Rules—Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 919–31 
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Treasury utilizes two types of delegated authority in 
promulgating Treasury regulations.24 Many provisions of the 
Code contain specific grants of authority to issue regulations.25 
The vast majority of Treasury regulations, however, are estab-
lished through the exercise of general rulemaking authority in 
I.R.C. § 7805(a), which grants Treasury the power to develop 
“all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of” the 
Code.26 Even where a specific authority grant supports a 
Treasury regulation, Treasury often will cite I.R.C. § 7805(a) as 
the primary or only authority behind the regulation in ques-
tion.27 
 
(1948); Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 
1, 2 (1940). 
 24. Although the I.R.C. delegates authority for promulgating regulations 
to the Secretary of the Treasury, see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1502, 7805(a) (2000), and 
Treasury regulations are issued by the Treasury Department, the IRS Office of 
Chief Counsel performs the function of initially drafting most regulations. See 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, 
§ 32.1.1.4.4 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/ch01s01.html 
[hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL]; see also LEANDRA LEDERMAN & 
STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.04 
(2d ed. 2002). This division of labor is consistent with historic practice. See 
Paul F. Schmid, The Tax Regulations Making Progress—Then and Now, 24 
TAX LAW. 541, 541–49 (1971) (describing past procedures for promulgating 
Treasury regulations). Despite the IRS’s involvement in the regulatory proc-
ess, because Treasury is the final and official issuer of Treasury regulations, 
this Article only addresses Treasury as the primary interpreter of the I.R.C. 
 25. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(i)(5), 167(e)(6), 357(d)(3), 453(j)(1), 952(d), 1502 
(2000). A search in the Westlaw FTX-USCA database for specific authority 
delegations derived from just one common phrasing, “‘Secretary shall’ /s pre-
scribe /s regulations,” resulted in 291 hits as of April 2006. 
 26. I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
 27. See, e.g., T.D. 9192, 2005-15 I.R.B. 866; T.D. 9155, 2004-40 I.R.B.562; 
T.D. 9154, 2004-40 I.R.B. 560; T.D. 8825, 1999-28 I.R.B. 19; T.D. 8560, 1994-
38 I.R.B. 5; T.D. 8531, 1994-17 I.R.B. 7; see also Boeing Co. v. United States, 
537 U.S. 437, 447–48 (2002) (noting Treasury’s reliance on I.R.C. § 7805(a) 
(2000) notwithstanding the applicable specific authority grant); Ellen P. 
Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 
51, 57 & nn.28–29 (1996) (noting Treasury’s position that tax regulations are 
almost always interpretative). For example, the Treasury issued a notice of 
proposed rulemaking in 1992 and published final regulations in 1994 that 
dramatically overhauled the investment adjustment system for consolidated 
entities under I.R.C. § 1502, one of the broadest specific authority delegations 
in the Code. See T.D. 8560, 1994-38 I.R.B. 5; Proposed Rules, Dep’t of Treas-
ury, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,634 (Nov. 12, 1992); ANDREW J. DUBROFF ET AL., FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS FILING CONSOLIDATED RETURNS 
§ 1.02 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the regulatory history of Treasury). In both the 
original notice and the final Treasury decision, the IRS cited § 7805 as the 
primary authority supporting the regulation and I.R.C. § 1502 and other spe-
cific authority grant provisions only for certain limited aspects of the new 
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The tax community differentiates the two types of regula-
tions by calling specific authority regulations “legislative” and 
general authority ones “interpretative.”28 Nevertheless, in prac-
tice, Treasury purports to develop all of its regulations, 
whether premised upon specific or general authority, using the 
APA’s public notice and comment procedures.29 Since long be-
fore Chevron, however, and consistent with the tax commu-
nity’s categorization, Treasury has taken the position that its 
general authority regulations are interpretative only and that 
it does not have to follow the notice-and-comment process for 
such regulations.30 Since Treasury regularly cites I.R.C. 
§ 7805(a) as the legal basis even for regulations that seemingly 
fall within the scope of a specific authority provision, Treas-
ury’s position on this point means that Treasury rarely admits 
to the applicability of the APA’s notice and comment require-
ments. 
With National Muffler and other, earlier tax cases, the 
Court spoke directly to the question of judicial deference in the 
tax context. In the years before deciding Chevron, the Supreme 
Court was quite clear that it considered general authority 
Treasury regulations elaborating ambiguous or undefined 
statutory terms to be interpretative in nature and entitled to 
less deference than specific authority Treasury regulations.31 
The accepted theory among the tax community is that, at least 
before Chevron if not also after, specific authority Treasury 
regulations were given “controlling deference,” meaning that 
 
regulations. See T.D. 8560, 1994-38 I.R.B. 5; Proposed Rules, Dep’t of Treas-
ury, 57 Fed. Reg. at 53,634 (Nov. 12, 1992). In the final Treasury Decision, the 
Treasury stated without explanation its position that the APA’s notice and 
comment requirements were inapplicable notwithstanding the clearly legisla-
tive nature of these regulations. See T.D. 8560, 1994-38 I.R.B. 5. 
 28. See, e.g., LEDERMAN & MAZZA, supra note 24, § 9.02[A][1]; SALTZMAN, 
supra note 1, ¶ 3.02[3][a]–[b] (2d ed. 2002); Aprill, supra note 27, at 56–57; 
Coverdale, supra note 14, at 35; Salem et al., supra note 20, at 728. 
 29. See LEDERMAN & MAZZA, supra note 24, § 9.02[A][1]; Michael Asimow, 
Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy State-
ments, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 524 (1977); Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez, 
Jr., 101 J. TAX’N 230, 231 (2004). My own sense from reviewing the Treasury’s 
notices and final Treasury Decisions is that the Treasury’s adherence to APA 
rulemaking requirements is sufficiently spotty to be susceptible to legal chal-
lenge. More substantial analysis of this perception is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 30. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 24, § 32.1.2.3 (2004); Sa-
lem et al., supra note 20, at 728. 
 31. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24–25 (1982); 
Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252–53 (1981). 
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the courts would only reject such regulations if they were 
plainly inconsistent with the statute. Meanwhile, general au-
thority Treasury regulations were accorded some lesser degree 
of “weight” to the extent they satisfied various factors articu-
lated in National Muffler and its predecessors.32 In practice, 
the Court has not always been so consistent.33 
Chevron was not a tax case, and the Court’s post-Chevron 
analysis of Treasury regulations has been markedly erratic and 
thus can be read to support almost any argument.34 Ultimately, 
however, those in favor of tax exceptionalism rely largely on 
pre-Chevron practices and deference doctrine to excuse tax 
from the broader Chevron revolution. Like any other revolu-
tion, Chevron altered preexisting norms. Consequently, argu-
ments against applying Chevron in the tax context that are 
premised on pre-Chevron standards only work if the pre-
Chevron tax tradition differs from the broader jurisprudence 
supplanted by Chevron. 
Part II below explains why I believe that the supposedly 
unique tax-deference tradition is in fact not at all exceptional, 
and instead merely reflects general pre-Chevron administrative 
law doctrine. To understand that discussion fully, however, it is 
important briefly to review the two allegedly competing defer-
ence approaches—the Chevron/Mead framework and National 
Muffler—and the struggle of scholars and courts to reconcile 
them. Although National Muffler was decided first chronologi-
cally, Chevron and Mead represent the current general norm 
against which to evaluate National Muffler (rather than vice 
versa, as some in the tax community seem to believe). Accord-
ingly, let us consider the Chevron regime first. 
 
 32. See Aprill, supra note 27, at 58–61 (describing tax deference stan-
dards); Coverdale, supra note 14, at 53, 63–75 (same). 
 33. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Portland Cement Co. 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) 
(applying National Muffler deference to a specific authority Treasury regula-
tion); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978) (applying strong def-
erence to a general authority Treasury regulation); see also 5 KENNETH CULP 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 424 (2d ed. 1984) (noting the Court’s 
inconsistency). 
 34. Compare Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–61 (1991) 
(citing National Muffler), with Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 
507 U.S. 546, 575–76 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing both National Muf-
fler and Chevron), and Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382, 387–89 
(1998) (citing Chevron and applying its two-step analytical approach). See also 
infra Part II.A.3. 
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A. CHEVRON (AND MEAD AND SKIDMORE) 
The Chevron story is so well-known that it can be quickly 
summarized. Similar to I.R.C. § 7805(a), the Clean Air Act 
gives the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) the authority to “prescribe such regulations as 
are necessary to carry out his functions under” the Act.35 Using 
APA notice and comment procedures, the EPA exercised its 
general rulemaking authority to promulgate a regulation defin-
ing a statutorily undefined term freighted with policy implica-
tions, “stationary source.”36 A change in presidential admini-
strations prompted reconsideration, however, and the EPA 
employed the same procedures again to adopt a new regulatory 
definition with different consequences for regulated parties.37 
In upholding the latter interpretation against a challenge by 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court 
called for a strong form of judicial deference for all such agency 
regulations, so long as the regulations were “reasonable.” The 
Court chastised the Court of Appeals, which had rejected the 
new regulation, for substituting its own judgment for that of 
the agency.38 
Chevron is most often recognized for the two-part inquiry 
the Court articulated for evaluating agency interpretations of 
law: first, whether the statute being interpreted clearly and 
unambiguously resolves the issue; and if not, whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is a permissible one.39 
Standing alone, however, the two-part test is remarkable more 
as a tool for organizing judicial analysis than as a doctrinal 
statement. Even before Chevron, if the meaning of the statute 
was plain, then there was no opportunity for an agency to claim 
judicial deference.40 Unambiguous statutes are not susceptible 
 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) (2000). 
 36.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
840–41 (1984) (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981)). 
 37. See id. at 853–57 (discussing the history of the EPA’s amendments 
and definitions). 
 38. See id. at 843–45. 
 39. See id. at 843–44. 
 40. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117–19 (1978) (rejecting an 
agency interpretation as inconsistent with the statutory language); Zuber v. 
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 181, 183–85 (1969) (same); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit 
Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 610–11 (1944) (same); Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. 
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (“True indeed it is that administrative 
practice does not avail to overcome a statute so plain in its commands as to 
leave nothing for construction.”).  
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of multiple interpretations; and absent constitutionality issues, 
it is axiomatic that the courts are bound to follow the clearly 
expressed intent of Congress. Moreover, long before deciding 
Chevron, the Court advocated strong, mandatory deference to-
ward “legislative” regulations promulgated pursuant to express 
congressional command.41  
The more revolutionary but less often recognized aspect of 
Chevron is its call for strong, mandatory deference not only 
where Congress specifically mandates regulations, but also 
where Congress implicitly delegates rulemaking authority 
through the combination of statutory ambiguity and adminis-
trative responsibility, as exemplified by the Clean Air Act and 
the EPA.42 This extension of strong judicial deference from ex-
plicit to so-called implicit delegations represents a transfer of 
interpretive power from the judicial branch to administrative 
agencies.43 This, more than the two-part test, is the heart of the 
Chevron doctrine.44 
Why extend the Court’s existing strong deference tradition 
beyond legislative regulations promulgated pursuant to express 
congressional command? The Court here was quite plain. Re-
solving statutory ambiguity necessarily implicates choosing 
among various policy alternatives; and it is the job of adminis-
 
 41. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. 
Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425–26 (1977); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937); AT&T Corp. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 
236–37 (1936); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES: 
1989 SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 2D at 505–14 (1989) 
(suggesting that Chevron reflects long-standing doctrine); BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.34 (3d ed. 1991) (same); see also infra 
Part II.A (discussing pre-Chevron deference standards). 
 42. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to 
an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a 
case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision 
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (em-
phasis added)); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44) (rec-
ognizing statutory ambiguity as a delegation of interpretive authority to agen-
cies); DAVIS, supra note 41, at 508, 525 (acknowledging Chevron’s expansion of 
the strong deference doctrine). 
 43. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 41, at 508 (describing Chevron as transfer-
ring power from courts to agencies); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 834 (2001) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) 
(same). 
 44. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Bal-
ance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 759, 762 (1991); 
Farina, supra note 13, at 456–57. 
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tering agencies, not the courts, to make those policy choices.45 
By recognizing that there may be more than one permissible 
way to interpret an ambiguous statute, and allowing the 
agency freedom within the boundaries of permissibility, the 
Court not only gives an agency flexibility to choose the policy 
alternative it thinks best, but also allows the agency to change 
its mind if its first approach proves inadequate or ill conceived 
in hindsight.46 
Nevertheless, for most of Chevron’s tenure, it has been un-
clear precisely how far the Court intended to extend its reach.47 
As in Chevron itself, the most obvious implicit delegation would 
seem to be a general grant of authority to issue rules and/or 
regulations where necessary to implement and administer a 
statute.48 Chevron jurisprudence from the 1990s is a mess of 
circuit splits and general confusion over the scope of the doc-
trine’s applicability—asking, among other things, the question 
of what precisely constitutes an implicit delegation.49 
A primary source of the confusion over Chevron’s applica-
bility was disagreement among courts and scholars over the le-
gal foundation supporting the Chevron doctrine.50 The Chevron 
opinion itself sounds themes of congressional delegation, 
agency technical expertise, and democratic accountability.51 
 
 45. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844–45 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 
367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961)). 
 46. In the Chevron opinion alone, the Court’s willingness to permit an 
agency to change its mind is apparent. First, the Court disregarded the fact 
that the EPA initially adopted one regulatory definition but then, upon a 
change of presidential administrations, reconsidered the issue and adopted the 
definition at issue through a second round of notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Second, the Court criticized the D.C. Circuit for adopting a “static” definition 
of stationary source even though the statute was more flexible. Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842, 857–58; see also Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2699–2700 (describing “the 
whole point of Chevron” as to give agencies “the discretion provided by” statu-
tory ambiguity to change interpretations “in response to changed factual cir-
cumstances, or a change in administrations”). 
 47. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind 
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3–5 (1990); John F. Duffy, Ad-
ministrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 199–203 
(1998); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 835. 
 48. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with 
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 471 (2002). 
 49. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 848–52. 
 50. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default 
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2139 (2002) (discussing the debate); Merrill 
& Hickman, supra note 43, at 863–73 (same). 
 51. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 865; see also, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (emphasiz-
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Scholars posited a variety of legal foundations for Chevron in-
cluding not only congressional delegation52 but others ranging 
from constitutional requirement53 to mere judicial policy.54 
Changing Chevron’s underlying premise alters the scope of the 
doctrine’s applicability.55 Complicating the issue further still 
was the conception that the choice for the courts would be 
Chevron’s strong, mandatory deference or no deference at all,56 
notwithstanding clear policy arguments in favor of some defer-
ence even where strong Chevron deference might seem inap-
propriate.57 
The Court took a significant step toward resolving the gen-
eral confusion, however, in United States v. Mead Corp. Mead 
declared congressional delegation to be the underlying ration-
ale for Chevron deference and offered a companion two-part 
test for determining whether Chevron should apply in a given 
situation: first, whether Congress has given the agency in ques-
tion the authority to bind regulated parties with “the force of 
 
ing agency expertise); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 
546, 575 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing regulation writing as 
inherently political); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–97 
(1991) (stressing agency expertise and respect for political branches). 
 52. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 47, at 4; Michael Herz, Textualism and 
Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1663, 1666 (1991); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial 
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 
623–27 (1996); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 872; Antonin Scalia, Ju-
dicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 
516–17. 
 53. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies 
and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988); Rich-
ard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 
2227 (1997). 
 54. See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency 
Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1289–98; William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618–19 
(1992); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Admin-
istrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 357–62 (2000). 
 55. See Callahan, supra note 54, at 1294; Gans, supra note 20, at 734–35; 
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 863–73. 
 56. See, e.g., Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 483–84 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Richards, 67 F.3d 1531, 1542 (10th Cir. 1995); Ra-
paport v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 216–17 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 57. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001) (indicat-
ing that in the absence of Chevron deference, there are still viable policy rea-
sons for granting a lesser degree of deference); see also Merrill & Hickman, 
supra note 43, at 858–63 (discussing same). 
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law”; and if so, whether the agency has “exercised that author-
ity.”58 As part of that scheme, Mead and its foreshadowing 
predecessor, Christensen v. Harris County,59 clearly establish 
that the choice for the courts is not between Chevron or no def-
erence at all by revitalizing the classic, pre-Chevron deference 
case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.60 as an intermediate deferen-
tial alternative.61 
Like Chevron after it, Skidmore required the Court to con-
sider the validity of an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute, in this case the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) con-
cerning eligibility for overtime pay.62 The Administrator of the 
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hours Division had issued 
only informal rulings applying the statute in various circum-
stances, as opposed to a regulation; and none of those rulings 
resolved the case in question.63 Nevertheless, the Administra-
tor filed an amicus brief expressing his view of how that infor-
mal guidance should be applied to the case at bar.64 Congress 
had expressly by statute given the courts, rather than the Ad-
ministrator, primary interpretive responsibility over the 
FLSA;65 but the Court recognized its own past practice of giving 
weight to interpretations by executive agencies of statutes they 
administered.66 To reconcile these considerations, the Court of-
fered a series of factors for courts to use in assessing the appro-
priate level of judicial deference toward agency views in such 
 
 58. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 59. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 60. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 61. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–35; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
 62. The FLSA requires employers to pay one and one-half times an em-
ployee’s regular wages for hours worked in excess of forty per week. See 29 
U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000). The question before the Court in Skidmore was 
whether firefighters were working for purposes of the FLSA overtime provi-
sion during the time they were required to be on duty at or near the firehouse 
to respond to incoming fire alarms, even though the firefighters typically spent 
such waiting time sleeping or engaged in other amusement activities like pool 
or dominos. 323 U.S. at 136. In a companion case, Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 
323 U.S. 126 (1944), the Court analyzed the relevant statutory provisions and 
found the question dependent upon the interpretation of the statutory defini-
tion of “employ” as “to suffer or permit work,” which definition the Court found 
not to be dispositive of the Skidmore question. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136 
(discussing Armour); see also Armour, 323 U.S. at 133–34. 
 63. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138–39. 
 64. See id. at 139. 
 65. See id. at 137 (citing Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523 
(1942)). 
 66. See id. at 140. 
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circumstances: 
The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon 
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its rea-
soning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to con-
trol.67 
By its own terms, Skidmore “respect” is both limited and 
open ended.68 Skidmore allows a reviewing court to be the final 
arbiter of whether the agency’s interpretation is persuasive but 
specifies some factors and allows for the existence of others 
that a court should consider in evaluating the agency’s case.69 
Some commentators have likened Skidmore respect to a sliding 
scale, with informal agency interpretations qualifying for levels 
of deference ranging from Chevron-like to none at all depending 
upon a court’s analysis of the various factors.70 Others would 
describe Skidmore as considerably less defined.71 
Regardless of the precise contours of Skidmore respect, 
Chevron and Skidmore have divergent justifications and serve 
 
 67. Id. Citing Skidmore, the Mead Court paraphrased these factors in say-
ing that agency interpretations not entitled to Chevron deference should be 
evaluated based upon “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formal-
ity, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s posi-
tion.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
 68. In its holding, the Mead Court held that the tariff ruling at issue was 
entitled to “respect according to its persuasiveness.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. 
Alluding to this phraseology, some scholars use the term “Skidmore respect” 
rather than “Skidmore deference” in distinguishing the Skidmore approach 
from Chevron deference. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the 
Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 198 n.80 (2004) (explaining his rationale 
for using “Skidmore respect” terminology); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: 
Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1105, 1127, 1132–33 (2001) (using the phrase). But see Merrill & 
Hickman, supra note 43, at 855 (suggesting that Skidmore is better regarded 
as a true deference doctrine). Thorough consideration of whether Skidmore’s 
standard is more appropriately characterized as truly deferential or merely 
respectful is beyond the scope of this Article. Solely for purposes of clarity, I 
will refer to the Skidmore standard as “Skidmore respect” rather than 
“Skidmore deference.” 
 69. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (describing informal rulings as “not 
controlling upon the courts”). 
 70. See Anthony, supra note 47, at 14; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Defer-
ence to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 977 (1992). 
 71. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative 
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565–66 (1985) (recognizing the pre-Chevron def-
erence doctrine as reflecting degrees of deference and discussing relevant fac-
tors); Rossi, supra note 68, at 1125–29 (analyzing Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), as reflecting three different views of Skidmore 
respect). 
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different purposes. As the Supreme Court in Mead affirmed, 
Chevron “rests on a presumption about congressional intent” 
that Congress, at least implicitly, wanted an agency rather 
than the courts to be the primary interpreter of a particular 
statutory scheme.72 Chevron’s scope is limited, with Chevron 
only applying where a court affirmatively finds that Congress 
implicitly delegated primary interpretive power and the agency 
at least exercised that power with the action in question.73 
Moreover, Chevron does not call on the courts to abdicate their 
responsibility for interpreting the law altogether. The APA 
clearly contemplates judicial oversight of agency action;74 and 
Chevron has never been a blank check.75 But where the review-
ing court finds the requisite delegation and exercise thereof, 
and where Congress either declined or failed to resolve the 
question at issue, Chevron deference is required. 
By contrast, Skidmore is at heart a doctrine of judicial 
prudence. Even where the courts, rather than the agency, are 
the designated interpreter of statutory language, the courts 
may lack the resources and expertise to understand and evalu-
ate fully the consequences of complex statutory schemes.76 As 
the Court acknowledged in Skidmore, agencies often are simply 
better positioned to assess and apply alternative statutory in-
terpretations.77 Where the courts are satisfied that an agency is 
not otherwise behaving in an arbitrary or unreasonable man-
ner, they are often sensible to defer to the agency’s greater ex-
pertise and, sometimes, extensive interpretive efforts.78 By fo-
 
 72. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–30 n.11. 
 73. Id. at 226–27; see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 813 (describing Mead’s 
holding). 
 74. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). 
 75. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 481 (2001) 
(rejecting the agency’s interpretation at Chevron step two); FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000) (rejecting the agency’s 
interpretation at Chevron step one); AT&T Corp. v. Ia. Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 
366, 389–92 (1999) (rejecting the agency’s interpretation at Chevron step two). 
 76. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Where Skidmore or even Chevron deference applies to an agency’s le-
gal interpretation, the courts still evaluate agency action for adequacy of proc-
ess under the arbitrary and capricious review standard of APA § 706(2)(A). See 
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699–2700 (2005) (discussing the relationship 
between Chevron and hard-look review); Martin v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157–58 (1991) (noting the applicability 
of both Skidmore and hard look review). 
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cusing as much on the agency’s thoroughness and consistency 
as on the interpretation itself, the Skidmore factors allow a re-
viewing court leeway to police and defer to an agency simulta-
neously. And by bringing Skidmore back into the deference 
lexicon, Mead appropriately precludes Chevron deference from 
impermissibly encroaching upon the function that Congress, 
through the APA, intended courts to serve. 
B. THE NATIONAL MUFFLER “ALTERNATIVE” 
Although National Muffler predates Chevron by several 
years, National Muffler quite resembles Chevron, in that Na-
tional Muffler also involved a regulatory definition of an impor-
tant but undefined statutory term, “business league.”79 Much 
like the EPA in Chevron, Treasury initially exercised its gen-
eral rulemaking authority under I.R.C. § 7805(a) to adopt a 
definition that clearly would have included the petitioner.80 
Within a few years, however, Treasury changed its mind and 
promulgated a new regulation with a narrower definition that 
arguably excluded the petitioner.81 This second definition stood 
unchanged and unchallenged for decades;82 but like the statu-
tory term it defined, the regulation proved ambiguous, leading 
the IRS to issue several clarifying revenue rulings.83 Applying 
the standard it developed through those revenue rulings, the 
IRS maintained that the petitioner’s organization was not a 
business league.84 
The Court’s analysis in National Muffler is somewhat con-
voluted, which may partly explain why its post-Chevron appli-
cability remains such a question. The petitioning taxpayer’s 
challenge raised two separate underlying issues: first, whether 
Treasury properly interpreted the Code when it adopted its re-
vised definition of business league; and second, whether the 
IRS correctly interpreted its own regulation in concluding that 
 
 79. Section 501(c)(6) of the I.R.C. has long exempted from federal income 
taxation any organization that is a business league. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) 
(2000). 
 80. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 475–78 
(1979). 
 81. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (2005). 
 82. The current definition was adopted in 1925. See Nat’l Muffler, 440 
U.S. at 481. 
 83. Id. at 482–83; see also Rev. Rul. 76-400, 1976-2 C.B. 153; Rev. Rul. 68-
182, 1968-1 C.B. 263; Rev. Rul. 67-77, 1967-1 C.B. 138; Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-
1 C.B. 244. 
 84. See Nat’l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 488–89. 
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the taxpayer was not a business league. The latter question ar-
guably implicates a wholly separate pre-Chevron deference doc-
trine, known as Seminole Rock deference, which counsels def-
erence to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation so 
long as not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion.”85 
Regardless, while recognizing the dual nature of the in-
quiry, the Court’s opinion in National Muffler nevertheless 
blends much of the analysis of the two questions. Speaking par-
ticularly to the regulation, the Court spoke at length of the ap-
propriateness of deference.86 The Court acknowledged Con-
gress’s delegation of rulemaking authority to Treasury, 
Treasury’s expertise in the field, and the need for consistent 
treatment of taxpayers.87 While emphasizing particularly the 
first of these considerations, the Court nevertheless articulated 
a full grab-bag of relevant factors in considering the validity of 
Treasury regulations: 
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the con-
gressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the 
regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its ori-
gin, and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it is a 
substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those 
presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the regula-
tion dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits 
inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the 
regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency 
 
 85. Seminole Rock deference is named for the case that articulated it, 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). In that case, the 
Court expressed a policy of strong, mandatory deference to an agency’s inter-
pretation of its own regulations. Id. at 413–14. In lieu of Seminole Rock, the 
Court often cites one of its progeny for the same proposition. See, e.g., Thomas 
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512–13 (1994); Stinson v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 36, 44–45 (1993); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The 
lower courts generally have recognized Chevron and Seminole Rock as sepa-
rate deference doctrines, but lower courts occasionally have applied Chevron to 
agency interpretations of agency regulations. See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Am., 
Inc. v. United States, 106 F.3d 376, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Malcomb v. Island 
Creek Coal Co., 15 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Paralyzed Veterans 
of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“It would seem 
that there are few, if any, cases in which the standard applicable under Chev-
ron would yield a different result [than under Seminole Rock].”). The signifi-
cance of Chevron and Mead for Seminole Rock deference is unclear and beyond 
the scope of this Article. For a defense of Seminole Rock in relation to Chevron 
and Skidmore, see Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of 
Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 49 (2000). 
 86. See Nat’l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 475–77. 
 87. See id. at 477. 
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of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Con-
gress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments 
of the statute.88 
The Court then applied these factors to evaluate the regu-
lation at issue, discussing at length the relevant statutory and 
regulatory history, and also noting that the regulation was of 
substantial duration and had been consistently applied by the 
IRS in its series of revenue rulings.89 Ignoring its own earlier 
inclusion of contemporaneity as a relevant factor, and perhaps 
foreshadowing a bit Chevron’s emphasis on regulatory flexibil-
ity and policy choice, the Court dismissed the observation that 
the Treasury’s current definition was not its first: “We would be 
reluctant to adopt the rigid view that an agency may not alter 
its interpretation in light of administrative experience.”90 
Without distinguishing between the regulation and the revenue 
rulings in its holding, the Court acknowledged that the gov-
ernment’s interpretation was not “the only possible one,” but 
concluded that “it does bear a fair relationship to the language 
of the statute, it reflects the views of those who sought its en-
actment, and it matches the purpose they articulated.”91 Ac-
cordingly, the Court upheld that interpretation as meriting “se-
rious deference” and “implement[ing] the congressional 
mandate” in a “reasonable manner.”92 
Particularly when viewed through a post-Mead lens, the 
National Muffler opinion is perplexing. On the one hand, the 
analytical approach suggested by the National Muffler stan-
dard closely resembles the multifactor inquiry advocated by 
Skidmore. At the same time, however, the Court dismissed the 
relevance of contemporaneity, approved of allowing interpretive 
flexibility, and otherwise spoke in a very Chevron-like manner 
of delegation and of “serious” deference toward reasonable 
regulations. 
C. CONFLICTING JURISPRUDENCE 
Interpreting National Muffler in the post-Chevron era has 
confounded the lower courts. The circuit courts of appeal and  
 
 
 88. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 89. Id. at 484. 
 90. Id. at 485. 
 91. Id. at 484. 
 92. Id. at 476 (citing United States v. Cartwright, 441 U.S. 546, 550 
(1973) and quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)). 
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the Tax Court are divided on the relationship between the two 
cases.93 
At least one circuit—the Sixth—has declared outright that, 
post-Mead, Chevron deference applies to Treasury regulations 
issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) as well as to Treasury regu-
lations expressly mandated by Congress.94 Yielding a similar 
outcome for different reasons, some of the circuit courts have 
decided that Chevron and National Muffler are indistinguish-
able.95 “[A]ny regulation which is ‘based upon a permissible 
construction’ of an ambiguous statue will almost always ‘im-
plement the congressional mandate in some reasonable man-
ner’ and vice versa.”96 Accordingly, these courts also ultimately 
apply the Chevron two-step analysis and controlling deference 
standard in evaluating all Treasury regulations regardless of 
their authority. Still other courts, however, believe National 
Muffler to require a lesser degree of deference than Chevron. 
Although the practical difference is not always apparent, in 
such jurisdictions, specific authority regulations are given “con-
trolling weight” pursuant to Chevron while general authority 
regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a) are given only 
“considerable weight” under National Muffler.97 
 
 
 93. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 
2001) (acknowledging a split and reserving the question); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Comm’r, 245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) (same). 
 94. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 348 F.3d 136, 140–
41 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 95. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978–83 
(7th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging some differences between the two cases but 
concluding that they are practically indistinguishable); Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 87 F.3d 99, 106 n.13 (3d Cir. 1996) (equating the two doctrines im-
plicitly by citation); Norwest Corp. v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 1404, 1408–09 (8th Cir. 
1995) (citing both Chevron and National Muffler for substantial deference to 
reasonable Treasury regulations); Cent. Pa. Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 
384, 390–92 (1995) (seeing a negligible difference between the two doctrines). 
The Eighth Circuit seems to follow this approach as well, but its precedents 
are mixed. Compare Walshire v. United States, 288 F.3d 342, 345–46 (8th Cir. 
2002) (citing Chevron for controlling deference toward general authority regu-
lation), and Norwest, 69 F.3d at 1408–09 (citing both Chevron and National 
Muffler for substantial deference to reasonable Treasury regulation), with St. 
Jude Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 1394, 1402 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying 
less deferential National Muffler standard to general authority regulation). 
 96. Bankers Life, 142 F.3d at 981 (quoting Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Comm’r, 40 F.3d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 97. See Snowa v. Comm’r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997); see also 
Schuler Indus., Inc. v. United States, 109 F.3d 753, 754–55 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(saying that Chevron is more deferential than National Muffler). 
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The Tax Court seems to be particularly divided and even 
more confused. In Robinson v. Commissioner, a post-Mead case 
decided by the Tax Court en banc regarding general authority 
Treasury regulations, the majority opinion stated that, 
“[a]lthough interpretative regulations are entitled to consider-
able weight, they are accorded less deference than legislative 
regulations, which are issued under a specific grant of author-
ity to address a matter raised by the relevant statute.”98 Yet 
the court then went on, in the very next paragraph, to prescribe 
Chevron’s two-step analysis, citing Chevron and admonishing 
that, “[i]f the administrator’s reading fills a gap or defines a 
term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature’s re-
vealed design, we give the administrator’s judgment ‘control-
ling weight.’”99 Moreover, despite extensive cites to National 
Muffler and other pre-Chevron tax deference cases describing 
the nature of its inquiry, the Tax Court’s evaluation of the 
regulation is indistinguishable from an opinion issued a few 
months earlier by Judge Gale in Square D. Co. & Subs. v. 
Commissioner, in which he applied Chevron to a specific au-
thority Treasury regulation.100 Judge Gale concurred in Robin-
son by joining an opinion that did not discuss the Chevron is-
sue, even though in Square D. he indicated that Chevron would 
be appropriate for all Treasury regulations, whether issued 
pursuant to general or specific authority.101 Meanwhile, two of 
the three dissenting opinions in Robinson, representing five of 
 
 98. Robinson v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 44, 68 (2002). Robinson actually called 
into question the validity of certain temporary Treasury regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the general authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000) but without 
the benefit of public notice and comment. See Robinson, 119 T.C. at 66–67. 
Whether temporary regulations so issued are generally entitled to Chevron 
deference remains an open question. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 
43, at 906–07 (discussing the question); Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, 
Challenging Temporary Treasury Regulations: An Analysis of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalid-
ity, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 248, 267–81 (2003) (same). Regardless, for pur-
poses of its evaluation, the Tax Court in Robinson expressly equated 
temporary regulations with other interpretative regulations adopted pursuant 
to § 7805(a). See Robinson, 119 T.C. at 67. 
 99. Robinson, 119 T.C. at 68 (quoting Nationsbank of N.C. v. Variable 
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995)). Judge Vasquez, dissenting in 
the Robinson case, observed the majority’s general adherence to Chevron 
analysis notwithstanding the majority’s statements to the contrary. See id. at 
119–20 (Vasquez, J., dissenting). 
 100. Compare Square D. Co. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 299, 307–
13 (2002), with Robinson, 119 T.C. at 69–75. 
 101. See Square D., 118 T.C. at 307 (citing Bankers Life, 142 F.3d 973). 
HICKMAN_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:34:36 AM 
2006] THE NEED FOR MEAD 1559 
 
the sixteen judges participating, concluded that Skidmore, not 
Chevron, provided the appropriate standard of review and that 
the majority’s opinion was inconsistent with that standard.102 
The Tax Court continued its inter-court disagreement over the 
applicability of the various standards more recently in Swal-
lows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner.103 There the majority re-
jected Chevron deference and declined to defer to general au-
thority Treasury regulations based on a less deferential 
National Muffler analysis notwithstanding strong, separate 
dissenting opinions by Judges Swift and Halpern advocating 
Chevron deference.104 
The disagreements among the lower courts are perhaps to 
be expected when one considers not only National Muffler’s 
muddled rhetoric but also the Supreme Court’s confusing sig-
nals on the issue. The Court on several occasions has had the 
opportunity to evaluate long-standing but ambiguous Treasury 
regulations interpreted by the IRS through revenue rulings or 
other more informal formats. Yet the Court’s record of defer-
ence in such cases is all over the map, alternatively citing 
Chevron or National Muffler while seemingly oblivious to the 
raging debate over the relationship between the two.105 
D. SCHOLARLY SUGGESTIONS 
Scholarly attempts to reconcile the jurisprudential mess 
similarly fail to achieve consensus, and indeed render the ques-
tion even more complicated than necessary. A prime example of 
this is the most recent entry, which in some sense is perhaps 
the most authoritative given the institution and individuals in-
volved: the report by the American Bar Association Tax Sec-
tion’s Task Force on Judicial Deference,106 which included such 
prominent contributors to the tax deference debate as Irving 
 
 102. See Robinson, 119 T.C. at 107–08 (Swift, J., dissenting); id. at 113–21 
(Vasquez, J., dissenting). 
 103. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. No. 6, 2006 WL 
196305 (Jan. 26, 2006). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Compare Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–61 (1991) 
(citing National Muffler), with Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 
507 U.S. 546, 575–76 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing both National Muf-
fler and Chevron), and Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382, 387–89 
(1998) (citing Chevron and applying its two-step analytical approach); see also 
infra Part II.A.3. 
 106. See Salem et al., supra note 20. 
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Salem,107 Ellen Aprill,108 and Linda Galler.109 The Task Force 
recommends Chevron deference for specific authority Treasury 
regulations; but for general authority Treasury regulations, the 
Task Force prescribed what they label as Chevron deference 
but which closer inspection of their analysis reveals is really a 
blended approach that incorporates National Muffler’s multi-
factor analysis as the standard for reasonableness at Chevron 
step two.110 In other words, the Task Force said, the Treasury’s 
interpretations would still be “controlling” on the courts, just 
like under Chevron proper; but the range of reasonableness for 
a general authority Treasury regulation would be narrower 
than that for a specific authority Treasury regulation.111  
Although the Task Force acknowledged that general au-
thority Treasury regulations are properly categorized as “legis-
lative” for APA purposes, the Task Force emphasized the “tra-
ditional and well-entrenched use of the term ‘interpretive’” for 
such regulations as the primary justification for this hybrid ap-
 
 107. See, e.g., Irving Salem & Richard Bress, Agency Deference Under the 
Judicial Microscope of the Supreme Court, 88 TAX NOTES 1257 (2000); Irving 
Salem, Judicial Deference, Consolidated Returns, and Loss Disallowance: 
Could LDR Survive a Court Challenge?, 43 TAX EXECUTIVE 167 (1991). 
 108. See Aprill, supra note 27; Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081 (2005) [hereinafter, Aprill, Interpretive Voice]. 
 109. See, e.g., Linda Galler, Chevron and the Administrative Regulation of 
Indexation: Challenging the Cooper Memorandum, 56 TAX NOTES 1791 (1992) 
[hereinafter Galler, Chevron and Administrative Regulation]; Linda Galler, 
Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. 
REV. 841 (1992); Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Recon-
ciling Divergent Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1995). 
 110. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 737–44. 
 111. Ellen Aprill made a similar pre-Mead attempt to combine Chevron and 
National Muffler with her “muffled Chevron” proposal. Aprill, supra note 27, 
at 82–84. Aprill’s proposal was premised on a perception that the Court’s ap-
plication of Chevron is limited largely to a textualist inquiry that ignores legis-
lative history and is subject to a presumption that the statutory language is 
plain and unambiguous. See id. at 64–67; see also Merrill, supra note 70, at 
972–75 (analyzing early Chevron cases to find textualism undermining Chev-
ron). Given National Muffler’s reliance on statutory purpose and history, 
Aprill suggested incorporating those elements into Chevron step-two analysis 
as guides to ascertaining the reasonableness of the Treasury’s interpretation 
of the Code. See Aprill, Muffled Chevron, supra note 27, at 83–84. While the 
Court’s Chevron analysis has been inconsistent in many respects, several opin-
ions issued since Aprill made her proposal have considered legislative history 
extensively in ordinary Chevron analysis. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133–156 (2000); Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 
522 U.S. 448, 457 (1998); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845–53, 862–63 (1984) (including extensive discussion 
of the Clean Air Act’s legislative history). 
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proach.112 The Task Force stated that National Muffler pro-
vides “considerable guidance” for its methodology, of course;113 
but the Task Force also carefully parsed Chevron and Mead to 
find support for its hybrid model114 and raised several norma-
tive justifications for taking “a cautious approach to a grant of 
broad deference” in tax cases.115 
The National Muffler considerations of statutory language, 
origin, and purpose are already incorporated in Chevron analy-
sis, however, which leaves such factors as contemporaneity, 
longevity, and consistency to be added by this modification to 
Chevron step two.116 Given the tendency of these latter factors 
to bind an agency to one interpretation, it is difficult to see how 
they are consistent with Chevron’s emphasis on giving the 
agency flexibility in making statutorily permissible policy 
choices to address changing conditions and political admini-
strations. Treasury’s range of reasonableness would be nar-
rowed right down to its original interpretation, or something 
close to it, even if the statutory language allowed alterna-
tives.117 Other than the two-step organization, it is difficult to 
distinguish the Task Force’s proposed modified-Chevron from 
National Muffler or Skidmore. 
Edward Schnee and Eugene Seago offer a similar but 
slightly different proposal for modifying Chevron in the tax con-
 
 112. Salem et al., supra note 20, at 739. 
 113. Id. at 740. 
 114. Id. at 738–41; see also discussion infra notes 256–59 and accompany-
ing text. 
 115. Id. at 723–26. 
 116. A common description of Chevron step one allows a reviewing court to 
utilize the traditional tools of statutory construction to ascertain the statute’s 
plain meaning, which would include considering the statute’s origin and pur-
pose at that stage. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 nn.44–45 (2001) 
(considering the statute’s original purpose at Chevron step one); Brown & Wil-
liamson, 529 U.S. at 133–34; Regions Hosp., 522 U.S. at 457. Even contempo-
raneity may enter into Chevron analysis to the extent that an agency’s con-
temporaneous construction of a statute may offer insight into congressional 
intent. See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 
294, 315 (1933) (recognizing these methodologies). 
 117. National Muffler involved the agency’s second attempt to define busi-
ness league, but that second interpretation survived in part by not being chal-
lenged for fifty years. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. Pre-
sumably the Task Force’s standard would allow that regulatory interpretation 
to stand; however, the Task Force offers no guidance for discerning at what 
point longevity and contemporaneity would trump the sort of statutorily per-
missible but politically inspired policy change generally sanctioned by Chev-
ron. 
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text. Like the Task Force, Schnee and Seago concede Chevron’s 
applicability to specific authority Treasury regulations; but 
they believe that general authority Treasury regulations should 
only be given what they describe as a lesser degree of deference 
premised on “reasonableness.”118 Whereas the Court generally 
uses that term interchangeably with permissibility in the Chev-
ron context,119 Schnee and Seago define their reasonableness 
standard as whatever produces “the better answer for the ma-
jority of taxpayers.”120 Yet Schnee and Seago fail to articulate 
what makes one interpretation better than another. Conse-
quently, their proposed standard would seem to require a re-
viewing court to make an independent judgment as to whether 
the better interpretation is one that reduces (or increases) 
taxes, imposes less paperwork, or appeals to more abstract no-
tions of fairness or efficiency, even if the court’s preferred policy 
goals differ from those of Treasury. Indeed, it is difficult to see 
how the standard Schnee and Seago propose defers to Treasury 
at all. 
While the Task Force and Schnee and Seago attempt to 
bridge the gap between Chevron and so-called traditional tax 
deference, other scholars argue more generally for the applica-
bility of Skidmore rather than Chevron to Treasury regulations. 
Mitchell Gans interprets Mead to mean that Chevron applies to 
both specific authority and general authority Treasury regula-
tions, but for normative reasons he advocates legislation ex-
pressly adopting Skidmore respect as the more appropriate 
standard for the latter.121 John Coverdale applies the frame-
 
 118. See Edward J. Schnee & W. Eugene Seago, Deference Issues in the Tax 
Law: Mead Clarifies the Chevron Rule—Or Does It?, 96 J. TAX’N 366, 371–72 
(2002). 
 119. The Court in Chevron seemed to use “reasonable” and “permissible” or 
derivations thereof interchangeably. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). In subsequent cases, the Court 
seemed to use one or the other in connection with Chevron step two, but of-
fered no hint that it regards the terms as anything other than synonymous in 
that context. Compare, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (ar-
ticulating step two as “when the statute ‘is silent or ambiguous’ we must defer 
to a reasonable construction by the agency charged with its implementation”), 
with Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002) (describing step two as 
“whether the interpretation, for other reasons, exceeds the bounds of the per-
missible”). 
 120. Schnee & Seago, supra note 118, at 372. 
 121. See Gans, supra note 20, at 792–93. Peter Lowy and Juan Vasquez, 
Jr., similarly imply in their analysis of deference and revenue rulings that 
Treasury regulations would be entitled to Chevron deference under Mead, but 
they do not discuss the issue outright. See Lowy & Vasquez, supra note 29, at 
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work of Chevron, Skidmore, and Mead to conclude that specific 
authority Treasury regulations warrant Chevron deference 
while general authority Treasury regulations qualify only for 
Skidmore respect.122 Coverdale also has expressed his prefer-
ence for what he identifies as traditional tax deference princi-
ples for both types of regulations: controlling deference through 
an inquiry that collapses Chevron’s two steps into one for spe-
cific authority Treasury regulations, and National Muffler or 
Skidmore respect (which Coverdale equates) for general au-
thority ones.123 
To some degree, these scholarly efforts all build upon dif-
ferent understandings of the Chevron doctrine; and the diverse 
conceptions of Chevron necessarily lead to inconsistent conclu-
sions concerning how the Chevron doctrine should apply in the 
tax context.124 That aspect of these analyses merely reflects the 
more general scholarly disagreement over what Chevron 
means. These disparate approaches to tax deference are consis-
tent, however, in their insistence that, whatever Chevron may 
mean for other areas of the law, tax is different and should be 
treated thus. 
II.  THE CASE AGAINST THE NATIONAL MUFFLER 
“ALTERNATIVE” 
As noted, the arguments for alternative, tax-specific defer-
ence standards for tax cases fall roughly into two categories: 
one doctrinal, resting on the belief that tax has its own defer-
ence tradition that should and perhaps does trump Chevron; 
and the other normative, based on various claims that tax is 
unique among regulatory fields. In truth, however, neither 
claim is accurate. 
A. COMPARING THE DOCTRINAL HISTORY 
The Court has a long history of deference toward Treasury 
regulations that not only pre-dates Chevron but extends back to 
the origins of the modern income tax. The Court also has an 
equally long pre-Chevron tradition of judicial deference toward 
 
232–33. 
 122. See John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of 
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 
81–83 (2003). 
 123. See Coverdale, supra note 14, at 54–55, 67–68. 
 124. Cf. supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
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agency legal interpretations generally. The questions as-yet 
unexamined are whether and how these conventions are re-
lated. Tracing the history of judicial deference in both tax and 
non-tax cases turns up more similarities than differences. 
1. Early Assumptions 
The rise of the administrative state in the early twentieth 
century yielded tremendous tension between the executive 
branch and independent administrative agencies on the one 
hand and the judicial branch on the other over questions of 
statutory interpretation.125 Agencies bring special resources 
and expertise to the task of administering the complicated 
regulatory schemes enacted by Congress; but the courts are 
also experts at statutory interpretation, and Marbury v. Madi-
son clearly established the Court as the primary interpreter of 
the law.126 
Giving executive branch and independent agencies exten-
sive authority to adopt legally binding regulations is largely a 
twentieth-century phenomenon. Many non-tax statutes enacted 
in the Progressive and New Deal Eras granted rulemaking au-
thority to executive branch and independent agencies.127 Some 
such authorizations were narrow and specific: for example, giv-
ing a specific agency like the Interstate Commerce Commission 
or the Federal Power Commission the power to impose uniform 
accounting rules for an industry whose rates were regulated 
and who consequently had to file annual reports of their assets, 
income, and expenses.128 Other grants of authority were broad 
 
 125. See Edward Clark Lukens, The Delegation of Power—A Neglected 
Constitutional Question, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 367, 367 (1935); Cass R. Sunstein, Law 
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079–82 (1990). 
 126. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see also Thomas W. 
Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 
37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 496 (2004) (“The tradition in administrative law 
is that Marbury stands foursquare for the proposition that courts must engage 
in de novo or independent review of all questions of law.”); Sunstein, supra 
note 125, at 2080 (acknowledging the same). 
 127. See generally John A. Fairlie, Administrative Legislation, 18 MICH. L. 
REV. 181, 183–88 (1920) (cataloguing early examples); Merrill & Watts, supra 
note 48, at 495–98 (discussing early statutes). 
 128. See, e.g., Federal Power Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 847, 
854 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 825(a) (2000)) (giving the FPC such authority); 
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 220, 48 Stat. 1064, 1078–80 (codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 220 (2000)) (giving the same to the FCC); Interstate Commerce 
Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, § 20, 24 Stat. 379, amended by Hepburn Act of 
1906, ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 593–95 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
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and general, giving agencies the power to adopt rules and regu-
lations as they deemed necessary to effectuate the statutes they 
administered.129 
Some of the very earliest of the modern income tax statutes 
granted both specific and general rulemaking authority to the 
Secretary of the Treasury and, under him, the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue. The Revenue Act of 1916 introduced a few 
specific rulemaking grants.130 Subsequent tax statutes included 
those and added more.131 The War Revenue Act of 1917 addi-
tionally introduced the predecessor to I.R.C. § 7805(a) allowing 
the promulgation of “all necessary rules and regulations for the 
enforcement” of the Act.132 
During this early period of regulatory expansion, non-tax 
commentators discussed at length the extent to which the Con-
stitution permitted Congress to delegate the authority to 
promulgate binding, substantive regulations without violating 
the nondelegation doctrine.133 In cases addressing a wide range 
of administrative actions, such as Buttfield v. Stranahan134 and 
United States v. Grimaud,135 the Supreme Court repeatedly de-
 
tions of 49 U.S.C.) (granting the same to the ICC). 
 129. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 
75-717, § 701, 52 Stat. 1040, 1055–58 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 371 (2000)); 
Communications Act of 1934 § 4(i). 
 130. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, ch. 463, §§ 5(a)(8), 
6(a)(7), 12(a)(2), 12(b)(2), 39 Stat. 756, 757 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C. (2000)) (authorizing regulations providing reasonable de-
pletion allowances for oil and gas wells and mines); id. §§ 8(g), 13(d) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2000)) (authorizing regulations 
establishing permissible accounting methods other than “actual receipts and 
disbursements”). 
 131. See Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil 
Case, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 252, 258 (1940) (identifying fifty-six specific authority 
delegations in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939); Fred T. Field, The Legal 
Force and Effect of Treasury Interpretation, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 91, 
95–96 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921) (listing specific authority grants found 
in the Revenue Act of 1918). 
 132. See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 71–77 (2000)). 
 133. See, e.g., John B. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 
YALE L.J. 892 (1918); Fairlie, supra note 127, at 189; Lee, supra note 23, at 2–
3; John D. McGowen, An Economic Interpretation of the Doctrine of Delegation 
of Governmental Powers, 12 TUL. L. REV. 179 (1938). 
 134. 192 U.S. 470, 494 (1904) (upholding a statute delegating to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury the authority to “fix and establish uniform standards of 
purity, quality and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into 
the United States”). 
 135. 220 U.S. 506, 522–23 (1911) (upholding the Forest Reserve Act’s dele-
HICKMAN_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:34:36 AM 
1566 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1537 
 
clined to characterize even broad delegations of authority to 
adopt binding regulations as unconstitutional delegations of 
legislative power.136 Yet the New Deal cases of Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan137 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States,138 which in 1935 struck down provisions of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act,139 offered proof that at least some 
delegations of legislative authority were unconstitutional. 
Although the Court almost always upheld congressional 
delegations of rulemaking authority on one ground or an-
other,140 the Court’s rhetoric in its nondelegation jurisprudence 
strongly influenced the scholarly characterization of regula-
tions and their relative legal weight. Scholars and practitioners 
of that period who surveyed the Court’s nondelegation cases 
generally agreed that Congress could constitutionally delegate 
the authority to promulgate binding regulations, so long as the 
grant to do so was narrow and specific.141 Regulations promul-
gated pursuant to such specific authority created “new law,” 
carried the force and effect of law, and were deemed legislative 
in character.142 
 
gation to the Secretary of Agriculture the broad authority to protect national 
forests and to impose criminal penalties for violating such regulations). 
 136. See also, e.g., Kan. City So. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423, 443 
(1913) (upholding a Hepburn Act provision giving the ICC discretion over ac-
counting rules for railroads); St. Louis & Iron Mountain Ry. v. Taylor, 210 
U.S. 281, 287 (1908) (upholding a Safety Appliance Act provision delegating to 
the ICC authority to certify certain freight car standards). 
 137. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 138. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 139. See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 432, A.L.A. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 
541–42. 
 140. Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry are the only two cases in 
which the Court has rejected congressional delegations of power to regulatory 
agencies as unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds. See PIERCE, supra 
note 23, § 2.6, at 91. 
 141. See 1 F. TROWBRIDGE VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
§ 489 (1942); Fairlie, supra note 127, at 189–97; Lee, supra note 23, at 2–3, 
21–25. 
 142. See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920) (de-
scribing such regulations as having “the force and effect of law if [they] be not 
in conflict with express statutory provision”). Both tax and non-tax commenta-
tors recognized this definition of legislative regulations. See Alvord, supra note 
131, at 259–60; Brown, supra note 23, at 384–85; Davis, supra note 23, at 928–
29; Lee, supra note 23, at 2–3; see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 
316 U.S. 407, 416–22 (1942) (recognizing the legal force of specific authority 
regulations). In their analysis of congressional intent and the force of law, 
Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts downplay the role of the nondele-
gation doctrine and emphasize the importance of penalties as evidence of con-
gressional intent that regulations carry the force and effect of law. See Merrill 
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By contrast, so-called interpretative regulations adopted 
pursuant to more general rulemaking grants of the “all neces-
sary rules and regulations” variety merely interpreted existing 
law, so could not carry such legal effect.143 A general rulemak-
ing grant that authorized binding regulations carrying the force 
and effect of law would be inconsistent with the nondelegation 
doctrine and thus constitutionally invalid.144 By contrast, non-
binding regulations reflecting administrative officials’ best 
guess of a statute’s meaning were merely exercises of executive 
power and did not require congressionally delegated author-
ity.145 The Administrative Procedure Act, adopted in 1946 to re-
form and bring uniformity to federal administrative process, 
implicitly incorporated these general principles in requiring 
procedures including public notice and opportunity for com-
ment for legislative regulations but not for interpretative 
ones.146 
Adhering to this analytical model, both tax and non-tax 
commentators considered Treasury’s specific authority regula-
tions to be legislative but its general authority regulations to be 
 
& Watts, supra note 48, at 488–92. They acknowledge, however, that Progres-
sive– and New Deal–Era courts and commentators showed no recognition of 
that convention. See id. at 503. Accordingly, the congressional convention 
Merrill and Watts identify is not inconsistent with my argument that the 
common understanding of the period required a specific authority grant before 
a regulation could be characterized as legislative and treated as binding on 
regulated parties as well as the government. 
 143. See, e.g., VOM BAUR, supra note 141, § 489; Alvord, supra note 131, at 
260–61; Davis, supra note 23, at 928–29; Stanley S. Surrey, The Scope and Ef-
fect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. 
PA. L. REV. 556, 557–58 (1940). 
 144. See, e.g., Alvord, supra note 131, at 260–61; Surrey, supra note 143, at 
557–58. 
 145. See, e.g., Fairlie, supra note 127, at 189; Surrey, supra note 143, at 
558. 
 146. The Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, 
generally considered the authoritative history of that statute, is consistent 
with this understanding. The Manual defines legislative regulations (which it 
calls “substantive rules”) as “rules, other than organizational or proce-
dural . . . , issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and which im-
plement the statute.” U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL 
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 23, 30 n.3 (1947). The Manual offers 
as examples of such regulations the Federal Power Commission’s rules pre-
scribing uniform systems of accounts and the SEC’s proxy rules, both of which, 
the Manual notes, carry the force and effect of law. See id. By contrast, the 
Manual defines as interpretative regulations (which it and the APA both call 
“interpretative rules”) as “rules or statements issued by an agency to advise 
the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it ad-
ministers.” See id. 
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merely interpretative and nonbinding on nondelegation 
grounds.147 As observed by Kenneth Culp Davis, however, 
“[a]lthough the theoretical distinction between legislative and 
interpretative rules is often clear, the practice does not always 
follow the theory, and in the borderland between the two kinds 
of rules, the differences, if any, are sometimes obscured or ig-
nored.”148 Davis offered as one example certain general author-
ity Treasury regulations interpreting the vague, one-sentence 
definition of “gross income” in what is now I.R.C. § 61.149 
Nevertheless, at least in theory, the implications of catego-
rizing a regulation as legislative or interpretative were marked 
when it came to judicial review. The Court made clear in non-
tax cases like Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Scar-
lett150 and AT&T v. United States151 that, so long as the delega-
tion was constitutionally valid, reviewing courts must uphold 
legislative regulations unless it was clear that the agency ex-
ceeded the scope of its rulemaking authority.152 In such cases, 
said the Court, “This court is not at liberty to substitute its own 
discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept 
within the bounds of their administrative powers.”153 The 
courts regularly applied this “controlling deference” standard in 
reviewing specific authority Treasury regulations as well.154 
 
 147. See, e.g., Alvord, supra note 131, at 259–61; Davis, supra note 23, at 
930; Lee, supra note 23, at 2; Surrey, supra note 143, at 557–58. 
 148. Davis, supra note 23, at 932. 
 149. See id. at 933–34 (“That the regulations are intended to be merely in-
terpretative along with the bulk of other tax regulations seems beyond doubt. 
Yet they are clearly designed to make bold and abrupt changes in the law.”); 
see also I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000) (defining gross income as “all income from what-
ever source derived” including but not limited to several listed items). 
 150. 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937). 
 151. 299 U.S. 232, 236–37 (1936). 
 152. The same principle of controlling deference applied as well where an 
agency exercised a specific authority grant through formal-adjudication proc-
esses. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (“But where 
the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a pro-
ceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it ini-
tially, the reviewing court’s function is limited.”); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 
412 (1941) (“Where, as here, a determination has been left to an administra-
tive body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion 
left untouched.”). 
 153. AT&T, 299 U.S. at 236–37; see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 
300 U.S. at 474; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134, 141 
(1932); Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423, 447 (1913); VOM 
BAUR, supra note 141, §§ 497, 499 (recognizing this standard); Davis, supra 
note 23, at 929 (same); Lee, supra note 23, at 29 (same). 
 154. See, e.g., Comm’r v. S. Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948) (con-
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In both non-tax and tax cases involving interpretative 
regulations, by contrast, the strong deference applicable to leg-
islative regulations did not apply. Instead, the Court reviewed 
interpretative regulations independently, but offered a variety 
of factors such as contemporaneity, longevity, and consistency 
that, where present, justified giving agency interpretations re-
spect.155 Subject-matter complexity and comparative institu-
tional expertise also played a role.156 Ultimately, the Court 
wrote the oft-quoted passage in Skidmore that has become the 
dominant articulation of this multifactor standard.157 Although 
Skidmore, like Chevron, was not a tax case, the Court in 
Skidmore analogized the Wage and Hour Division rulings at is-
sue to general authority Treasury regulations, signaling that 
the same standard should apply to both.158 
Again comparing actual practice to theory, Kenneth Culp 
 
sidering a broad, specific authority grant as the reason why a regulation 
“should not be overruled by the courts unless clearly contrary to the will of 
Congress”); Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 103 (1939) (describing 
the subject of specific authority regulation as “for the Congress and the Com-
missioner”); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931) (de-
scribing a specific authority regulation as “valid unless unreasonable or incon-
sistent with the statute”); see also Pictoral Review Co. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 
766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (applying a strong deference standard); Hamill v. 
Comm’r, 30 BTA 955, 958 (1934) (same); Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of 
the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398, 401 (1941) (discussing judicial 
review of specific authority Treasury regulations). 
 155. See, e.g., Burnet v. Chi. Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932) (acknowl-
edging that consistency is given great weight); Mason v. Routzahn, 275 U.S. 
175, 178 (1927) (deferring to contemporaneous and long-standing Treasury 
practice embodied in regulations); see also United States v. Pleasants, 305 
U.S. 357, 363 (1939) (declining to defer to a regulation inconsistently followed 
by the IRS); Griswold, supra note 154, at 404–11 (discussing the role of con-
temporaneousness and “long-continuedness” in giving interpretative Treasury 
regulations a legally binding effect). 
 156. See, e.g., California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 584 (1944) (empha-
sizing the U.S. Maritime Commission’s expertise in interpreting the Shipping 
Act); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 607 
(1942) (deferring to the Federal Power Commission’s “highly expert judgment” 
regarding the Natural Gas Act); Estate of Sanford v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 52 
(1939) (acknowledging IRS expertise concerning the I.R.C.); Chi., Rock Island 
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 95 (1931) (deferring to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission as “a body of trained and experienced experts”); 
see also Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 398 (1940) (declining to defer 
to Treasury regulations interpreting the National Industrial Recovery Act that 
“have not been consistent in their interpretation of the statute and do not em-
body the results of any specialized departmental knowledge or experience”). 
 157. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also supra 
notes 62–66 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
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Davis in particular noted that the authoritative weight of in-
terpretative rules varied considerably at the hands of courts 
weighing these factors.159 Within the general range of potential 
outcomes, complexity and expertise likely explain the courts’ 
propensity to give general authority Treasury regulations as a 
class slightly more deference than similar rules issued by other 
agencies.160 That tendency did not, however, rise to the level of 
a unique standard of review.161 Instead, the Court regularly 
applied Skidmore and/or its multifactor approach to evaluate 
interpretative regulations in tax and non-tax cases alike, but 
with one important practical distinction in terms of outcome.162 
Early in the first half of the twentieth century, the Court 
advocated a strong version of what is known as the reenact-
ment doctrine.163 Under this doctrine, interpretative regula-
tions that were contemporaneously adopted could become bind-
ing and carry the force of law if Congress reenacted the statute 
without substantially altering the regulation.164 The Court’s 
application of the reenactment doctrine was not limited to tax 
cases;165 but the ability of congressional reenactment to move 
 
 159. See Davis, supra note 23, at 934–43 (discussing judicial review of in-
terpretative regulations generally and Treasury regulations specifically). 
 160. See id. at 934–35 (noting a trend of giving Treasury regulations sig-
nificant deference). 
 161. See id.; see also Griswold, supra note 154, at 404–11 (emphasizing the 
importance of contemporaneity and longevity in evaluating general authority 
Treasury regulations). 
 162. Compare FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 
27, 37 (1981) (applying Skidmore to non-tax regulation), and Adamo Wrecking 
Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978) (same), with United States 
v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 127 & n.11 (1963) (applying Skidmore to a general au-
thority Treasury regulation). 
 163. See Brown, supra note 23, at 378–83. But see Helvering v. Wilshire Oil 
Co., 308 U.S. 90, 99–101 (1939) (suggesting limitations on the reenactment 
doctrine’s applicability); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936) (re-
jecting a long-standing Treasury regulation where the Court deemed the stat-
ute unambiguous). 
 164. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542, 546–47 n.10 (1945); Doug-
las v. Comm’r, 322 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1944); Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114–15 (1939); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 82–
83 (1938); Hartley v. Comm’r, 295 U.S. 216, 220 (1935); United States v. Da-
kota-Mont. Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459, 466 (1933); see also Brown, supra note 23, at 
399–404 (noting and criticizing the practice); Randolph E. Paul, Use and 
Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 YALE L.J. 660, 664–65 
(1940) (same). 
 165. See, e.g., Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932) (giving 
“great weight” to a Department of Labor regulation predating congressional 
reenactment); Nat’l Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 (1920) (call-
ing reenactment “an implied legislative recognition and approval of the execu-
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an interpretative regulation into the legislative category had 
important consequences in the tax context. 
For the first few decades of the federal income tax, when-
ever Congress chose to alter the income tax provisions signifi-
cantly, which it did every few years, Congress did so by reen-
acting the entire statute rather than merely enacting 
amendments.166 Although the common understanding was that 
general authority Treasury regulations were interpretative and 
nonbinding, the Court’s adherence to a strong form of the reen-
actment doctrine through the 1930s meant that an entire gen-
eration of general authority regulations was given virtually 
automatic legislative characterization, and consequently the 
force and effect of law, on reenactment doctrine grounds.167 
Several prominent tax commentators found this conclusion 
troubling and, in an effort to move general authority Treasury 
regulations back into the interpretative category, voiced addi-
tional justifications for distinguishing general from specific au-
thority Treasury regulations.168 One thought was that Treasury 
did not need specific authority to adopt interpretative regula-
tions in light of the general authority grant, so by including 
both types of authority in the various Revenue Acts, Congress 
must be signaling its intent that the specific authority regula-
tions be legislative and the general authority regulations be in-
terpretative in character.169 Regardless of the merits of these 
arguments relative to the original nondelegation basis for dis-
tinguishing the two types of Treasury regulations, the goal was 
to counter the impact of the reenactment doctrine to bring tax 
deference in line with general norms, not vice versa. 
In tax and non-tax cases both, the Court’s adherence to its 
own standards for reviewing legislative and interpretative 
 
tive construction of the statute”); United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Com-
pañia, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908) (“[T]he reenactment by Congress, without 
change, of a statute which had previously received long-continued executive 
construction, is an adoption by Congress of such construction.”); United States 
v. G. Falk & Bros., 204 U.S. 143, 152 (1907) (expressing same). 
 166. It was not until 1939 that Congress restructured the various existing 
tax laws into a single Internal Revenue Code and began making regular 
changes by merely amending that Code. See BITTKER, supra note 1, ¶ 1.1.5; 
Alvord, supra note 131, at 263. 
 167. See Paul, supra note 164, at 664 (“Our tax laws are reenacted so re-
peatedly that this [reenactment] rule is invoked more often than the general 
statement as to the validity of regulations standing alone.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 23, at 384–86; Griswold, supra note 154, 
at 400–01, 411–13; Surrey, supra note 143, at 557–59. 
 169. See Surrey, supra note 143, at 558. 
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regulations was frequently inconsistent.170 Reviewing the 
Court’s jurisprudence from the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, one can find references to contemporaneity, longevity, and 
reenactment in cases involving specific authority regulations171 
and reliance on specific authority precedents in cases involving 
general authority regulations.172 The excessive intrusion of the 
reenactment doctrine in tax cases only makes those cases even 
more difficult to reconcile coherently. Regardless, the jurispru-
dence from this period does not distinguish between tax and 
non-tax on the issue of judicial deference; and the scholarship 
likewise is remarkably consistent regarding the distinction be-
tween specific and general authority regulations and the theo-
retical ramifications for judicial review. In sum, the compara-
tive analysis of this period does not support the existence of a 
unique tax deference tradition. 
2. The Road to Chevron 
A significant strain of the Court’s jurisprudence continued 
to counsel different deference standards for specific author-
ity/legislative regulations as opposed to general author-
ity/interpretative regulations right up until the Court’s decision 
in Chevron.173 In 1977, in Batterton v. Francis, the Court 
evaluated a challenge to a legislative regulation promulgated 
by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to 
a specific authority grant in the Social Security Act and, in so 
doing, articulated deference standards fully consistent with the 
early understandings.174 The Court stated, “In exercising [the 
expressly delegated power to prescribe standards interpreting a 
statutory term], the Secretary adopts regulations with legisla-
tive effect. A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regu-
lations simply because it would have interpreted the statute in 
a different manner.”175 The Court then noted, “By way of con-
 
 170. See Davis, supra note 23, at 934 (“Courts frequently give as much ef-
fect to interpretative rules as to legislative rules, and courts frequently find 
ways to set aside legislative rules.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Comm’r v. S. Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); 
Burnet v. Sav. & Loan Bldg. Corp., 288 U.S. 406, 415 (1933); Fawcus Mach. 
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931). 
 172. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542, 547 n.10 (1945) (citing 
Fawcus Mach., 282 U.S. 375). 
 173. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.8, 
7.13 (2d ed. 1979); Merrill, supra note 70, at 973. 
 174. See 432 U.S. 416, 425–26 (1977). 
 175. Id. at 425. 
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trast, a court is not required to give effect to an interpretative 
regulation. Varying degrees of deference are accorded to admin-
istrative interpretations, based on such factors as the timing 
and consistency of the agency’s position, and the nature of its 
expertise.”176 
Subsequently, in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the Court con-
sidered at length whether certain voluntary disclosure regula-
tions issued by the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs constituted “law” for purposes 
of the Trade Secrets Act.177 Recognizing the distinction between 
legislative and interpretative regulations in the APA’s legisla-
tive history, the Court focused its inquiry on whether Congress 
had delegated to the agency the requisite legislative authority 
to act in such a manner.178 The only congressional authority 
grant the OFCCP could identify in support of its regulations 
was a general authority provision known as the “housekeeping 
statute,” which gives the heads of executive branch agencies 
general authority to issue procedural regulations governing 
employee behavior, record retention, and other general de-
partmental business performance matters.179 Recognizing the 
APA’s distinction between legislative and interpretative rules, 
the Court found the general authority grant in the housekeep-
ing statute inadequate to support legally binding, legislative 
regulations.180 In dicta, the Court quoted Batterton v. Francis 
also for the proposition that the appropriate evaluative stan-
dard for such regulations would be the multifactor analysis 
represented by Skidmore and its predecessors and progeny.181 
 
 176. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 
274–75 (1982) (articulating the same strong deference standard for specific 
authority regulations); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) 
(same). 
 177. See 441 U.S. 281, 295–316 (1979). 
 178. Id. at 302. 
 179. Id. at 308–09 (citing the housekeeping statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)). 
The OFCCP also offered as authority for its regulations another Department 
of Labor regulation and a presidential Executive Order, neither of which the 
Court considered representative of congressional delegation. See Chrysler, 441 
U.S. at 303–08. 
 180. See id. at 314–16. The Court left open the possibility that some gen-
eral authority grants might support legislative regulations, but then said 
without elaboration that the statute must show at least that Congress con-
templated the regulations at issue. Id. at 308. Separately, the Court consid-
ered relevant the agency’s failure to utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking in 
promulgating the regulations at issue. See id. at 313–15. 
 181.  Id. at 315. 
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Other non-tax opinions issued by the Court during this pe-
riod similarly emphasized the legislative or interpretative 
character of the source of the agency authority behind the regu-
lations under consideration.182 Likewise in the tax area. In 
Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States, the Court considered 
the validity of general authority Treasury regulations inter-
preting the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) provisions of the 
Code.183 Citing Batterton v. Francis among other cases, the 
Court made clear that it was applying a less deferential review 
standard because Treasury relied on the general authority 
grant of I.R.C. § 7805(a) rather than more specific authority in 
promulgating the regulation.184 By contrast, “[w]here the 
Commissioner acts under specific authority, our primary in-
quiry is whether the interpretation or method is within the 
delegation of authority.”185 
Despite the Court’s expressions of continued commitment 
to these long-standing principles, it was during this period that 
weaknesses in the old approach became more problematic. The 
1960s and 1970s saw a virtual explosion of agency rulemaking, 
with agencies seeking to achieve more policy objectives through 
general authority regulations.186 Traditional doctrine treated 
 
 182. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (citing 
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977), in support of strong deference 
due to Congress’s explicit delegation to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services of authority over the Medicaid statute); United States v. Clark, 445 
U.S. 23, 33–34 n.10 (1980) (citing Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425 n.9, in discussing 
the contemporaneity of, and declining to defer to, an informal Civil Service 
Commission interpretation of the Civil Service Retirement Act); see also Ar-
thur Earl Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the 
Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the 
A.P.A., 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 108–17 (1970) (citing earlier cases for the same 
dichotomy). 
 183. 452 U.S. 247, 248 (1981). 
 184. Id. at 253. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 23, § 1.6; Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and 
the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (1978); Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 546–49. 
Pierce traces the dramatic rise in rulemaking activity to several factors includ-
ing the enactment of several new federal statutes in the mid- to late-1960s 
that delegated rulemaking authorities to new or existing agencies. See PIERCE, 
supra. Pierce also points to the Court’s decisions in United States v. Florida 
East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), which 
largely replaced formal rulemaking with informal rulemaking as the norm and 
precluded judges from imposing procedural requirements beyond those ex-
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general authority rulemaking as interpretative, nonbinding, 
and not entitled to controlling deference.187 Modern practice, 
however, involved agencies increasingly utilizing general rule-
making grants to choose among alternative reasonable inter-
pretations of ambiguous statutes and defending their interpre-
tive choices in such terms.188 Meanwhile, since the Court never 
again invalidated a delegation of power to an agency on non-
delegation grounds after Panama Refining and Schechter Poul-
try, that doctrine faded as a limitation on congressional delega-
tion of rulemaking authority.189 
Both tax and non-tax opinions from this period reflect this 
tension. The lower courts addressed the expansion of rulemak-
ing activity by characterizing many general authority regula-
tions as legislative rather than interpretative based on what 
the regulations did rather than the source of their authority.190 
The Court likewise indicated more concern for the distinction 
between legislative and interpretative regulations and the con-
sequences for both the APA’s procedural requirements and ju-
dicial deference.191 In a few cases, the Court even made clear 
that it was evaluating regulations, as interpretative rather 
 
pressed in APA § 553 upon informal rulemaking efforts. See PIERCE, supra. 
 187. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 188. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.3 (3d ed. 
1991) (noting a rise in rulemaking); Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 549–70 
(documenting efforts by the Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, and National Labor Relations Board to claim previously unas-
serted legislative authority). 
 189. See PIERCE, supra note 186, § 2.6, at 91–93; see also 1 KENNETH CULP 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2 (2d ed. 1978) (describing non-
delegation as a failed legal doctrine); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW § 12 (1976) (opining that the nondelegation doctrine “can not be taken 
literally”). 
 190. See, e.g., Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 
697 (2d Cir. 1975) (concluding that FDA regulations issued pursuant to gen-
eral authority were nonetheless legislative because they were legally binding); 
see also 2 DAVIS, supra note 173, §§ 7.13, 7.15 (reflecting the change from prior 
understanding by noting that “[i]nterpretative rules sometimes have force of 
law and sometimes [do] not,” and documenting lower court blurring of the dis-
tinction between legislative and interpretative regulations); Michael Asimow, 
Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 393–
401 (discussing various tests for distinguishing legislative and interpretative 
regulations, and noting the declining relevance of the specific versus general 
authority distinction). 
 191. See, e.g., Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252–53 
(1981); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 517 n.13 (1981); 
Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295–316 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432 
U.S. 416, 425–26 n.9 (1977); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140–42 
(1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235–36 (1974). 
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than legislative, and thus using the Skidmore-type multifactor 
review standard, at the insistence of the parties.192 Oral argu-
ment transcripts in such cases include passages in which the 
Justices suggest to the litigants that the regulations at issue 
might be legislative instead, only to be rebuffed by attorneys 
relying on the traditional definitions of those categories.193 
Notwithstanding fairly evident interest by the Court, the par-
ties before it simply would not take the hint. 
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. offers a particularly 
good example of such behavior.194 Alessi involved an interpreta-
tion of I.R.C. § 411, issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) general 
authority through notice-and-comment rulemaking, as applied 
in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act context.195 
With extensive discussion, the Third Circuit determined that 
the regulation at issue was “plainly legislative in nature” and 
used a controlling-deference review standard.196 In an amicus 
brief filed with the Court, however, the government rejected 
that characterization even as it defended the regulation as an 
interpretive choice delegated to Treasury and the IRS by Con-
gress.197 At oral argument, when the Court inquired as to 
Treasury’s regulatory authority, attorneys for both parties de-
clined to defend the Third Circuit’s view.198 Since neither party 
cared to challenge the government’s characterization of the 
 
 192. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 & n.15 (1980); 
Alessi, 451 U.S. at 517 n.13. 
 193. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Alessi, 451 U.S. 504 (Nos. 79-
1943, 80-193), 1981 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 75, at *2–3; Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. 1 (No. 78-1870), 1980 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 9, at 
*4–8. 
 194. 451 U.S. 504. 
 195. Id. at 517–18. ERISA is a complicated statute that governs employee 
pension and welfare plans. Although most of the statute falls within Depart-
ment of Labor jurisdiction, the Secretary of the Treasury has regulatory au-
thority over certain ERISA provisions incorporated into the Internal Revenue 
Code. See, e.g., 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions § 3 (2005) (describing the ERISA 
statute); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT LAW 89–96 (3d ed. 2000) (same). 
 196. Buczynski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238, 1242–43 (3d Cir. 
1980). Buczynski and Alessi are the names of two different cases that were 
consolidated on appeal. At the Third Circuit, the cases were consolidated un-
der the Buczynski name, while at the Supreme Court, the cases are consoli-
dated under the Alessi name. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 504. 
 197. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 19 n.12, Alessi, 
451 U.S. 504 (Nos. 79–1943, 80–193), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1079, *28 
n.12. 
 198. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 193 at *2–3, *27–28. 
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regulation, the Court disregarded the Third Circuit’s analysis, 
treated the regulation as interpretative, and reviewed it under 
the multifactor review standard for interpretative rules.199 
The Court’s opinions from this period also demonstrate an 
increasingly deferential characterization of the Skidmore-style 
multifactor analysis, particularly where the interpretative rule 
in question was a regulation as opposed to a less formal format. 
I previously described National Muffler’s analysis as “perplex-
ing” for its combination of Chevron-style and Skidmore-style 
rhetoric.200 The same is true of the two cases routinely cited for 
the proposition that general authority Treasury regulations are 
entitled to “less deference” than specific authority ones, Rowan 
Cos. Inc. v. Commissioner and United States v. Vogel Fertilizer 
Co.201 In both, the Court expressly made such a statement and 
cited National Muffler as providing the evaluative standard for 
challenges to the validity of general authority Treasury regula-
tions.202 Yet the Court’s opinions in both cases also contain 
Chevron-like concepts, speaking of such regulations as valid so 
long as “they ‘implement the congressional mandate in some 
reasonable manner,’”203 and stating that “[a] Treasury Regula-
tion is not invalid simply because the statutory language will 
support a contrary interpretation.”204 
The Court’s articulation of its deference principles in the 
years leading up to Chevron was often similarly muddled in 
non-tax cases as well. For example, in Whirlpool Corp. v. Mar-
shall, a case involving an Occupational Safety and Health Act 
regulation adopted pursuant to a general rulemaking grant 
similar to I.R.C. § 7805(a), the Court identified the regulation 
as interpretative according to the Secretary of Labor’s charac-
terization, said that the Skidmore standard governed, but de-
scribed that standard as whether the regulation 
constitutes a permissible gloss on the Act by the Secretary, in light of 
the Act’s language, structure, and legislative history. Our inquiry is 
informed by an awareness that the regulation is entitled to deference  
 
 
 199. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 517–18 n.13 (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 
U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977), and other sources). 
 200. See supra notes 85–92 and accompanying text. 
 201. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); Rowan Cos., 
Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 202. See Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. at 24–25; Rowan Cos., 452 U.S. at 253. 
 203. Rowan Cos., 452 U.S. at 252 (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 
U.S. 299, 307 (1967)); see also Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. at 24 (quoting same). 
 204. Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. at 26. 
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unless it can be said not to be a reasoned and supportable interpreta-
tion of the Act.205 
The Court could have resolved the tension between tradi-
tional deference standards and expanded rulemaking activity 
by following the lead of the circuit courts and acknowledging 
the legislative character of many general authority regula-
tions.206 There is little evidence, however, that the Court ever 
contemplated resolving its concerns about the deference appli-
cable to general authority regulations this way.207 Instead, the 
Court offered Chevron, expanding the applicability of strong 
deference to implicit as well as explicit delegations and, subse-
quently, Mead, limiting Chevron’s scope to agency action carry-
ing the force of law. 
3. Post-Chevron Considerations 
The general consensus is that the Court did not intend to 
announce a major shift in its deference doctrine with Chev-
ron.208 Other scholars have ably demonstrated that the Court’s 
application of Chevron across the administrative law spectrum 
was inconsistent at best during its first decade, with the Court 
reaching independent decisions without mentioning Chevron in 
many cases in which deference was arguably appropriate.209 In 
fact, the Court did not cite Chevron any more often in the doc-
 
 205. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980). 
 206. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
 207. In Chrysler v. Brown, the Court alluded to the legal-effects test for dis-
tinguishing between legislative and interpretative rules. See 441 U.S. 281, 302 
(1981) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 235–36 (1974)). Since then, 
however, the Court has not articulated any alternative for distinguishing be-
tween legislative and interpretative regulations other than the source of au-
thority. The only two cases addressing the issue, Shalala v. Guernsey Memo-
rial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99–100 (1995), and Thomas Jefferson University v. 
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512–18 (1994), involved 5–4 decisions and offered 
mostly unhelpful, conclusory statements as to the character of the rules at is-
sue. 
 208. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: 
Highlights from the Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 
10,606, 10,613 (1993) (analyzing Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers to con-
clude that the Justices did not focus on the broader implications of the Chev-
ron opinion); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 838 (discussing 
how Chevron first achieved prominence in the lower courts). 
 209. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 70, at 980–85 (reviewing and performing 
empirical surveys and arguing that Chevron did not actually result in in-
creased Supreme Court deference to agency interpretations); Russell L. 
Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV. 129, 131 (1993) (sug-
gesting that “Chevron’s importance has been exaggerated”). 
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trine’s second decade than in the first.210 Nevertheless, the 
lower courts rely heavily on Chevron,211 and when the Court 
acts in a deferential mode, it typically speaks in terms of Chev-
ron and, in the last few years, Mead and Skidmore.212  
But not always. In the tax context, as noted above, the 
Court has been woefully inconsistent in what, if any, deference 
doctrine it intends to apply. Since deciding Chevron, the Court 
has cited National Muffler and Chevron each twice in majority 
opinions, and it has cited National Muffler three times to Chev-
ron’s two in separate concurring or dissenting opinions.213 
Once, in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Commissioner, Justice 
Souter, writing in dissent, cited both Chevron and National 
Muffler in the same passage for general deference proposi-
tions.214 
Post-Chevron, the Court cites National Muffler most rou-
tinely for the proposition that courts should defer to Treasury 
regulations that reasonably interpret the Code,215 an unre-
 
 210. Though hardly a careful analysis of the Court’s application of Chevron, 
a quick Westlaw search demonstrated that the Court cited Chevron 86 times 
from the day it was decided in June 1984 through June 1994, but only 74 
times from October 1994 through June 2004. Additionally, there are four post-
Mead cases through the 2003–2004 Term in which the Court cited Mead 
and/or Skidmore but not Chevron. Search of WESTLAW (April 21, 2006). 
 211. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doc-
trine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental 
Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2005) (describing empirical research). 
 212. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699–2711 (2005); Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 
1546–49 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716, 736 
(2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 
542 U.S. 241, 269 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Household Credit Serv., Inc. 
v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004); Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 24 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 
600 (2004); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 
(2004); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). 
 213. Compare Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 
576 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron), and United States v. 
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same), with United 
Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 840 (2001) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing National Muffler); Comm’r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 
120, 127 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring and Scalia, J., dissenting) (same), 
and Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 576 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same). 
 214. See Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 576 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 215. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 
200, 219 (2001); Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. at 120; Newark Morning Ledger, 
507 U.S. at 575–76 (Souter, J., dissenting); Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 
U.S. 554, 560–61 (1990); see also Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 
212, 222 (1989) (citing National Muffler for such a proposition in connection 
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markable pronouncement under any of Mead, Chevron, or 
Skidmore.216 The Court similarly cites Chevron regularly in 
non-tax cases for the mere point that courts should defer to rea-
sonable agency interpretations of the statutes they adminis-
ter.217 In one non-tax case, Meyer v. Holley, the Court even cited 
both Chevron and Skidmore for the statement that “the Court 
ordinarily defers to an administering agency’s reasonable 
statutory interpretation.”218 Carefully reading the Court’s lan-
guage can be illuminating at times, but in post-Chevron tax 
cases, the Court’s reliance on National Muffler for this point is 
best characterized as deference boilerplate. By way of compari-
son, the Court regularly cites non-tax pre-Chevron cases like 
Batterton v. Francis and Schweiker v. Gray Panthers to support 
similar deference rhetoric, either in conjunction with Chevron 
or not.219 
Citation counts and the Court’s rhetoric in citing National 
Muffler therefore say little or nothing about National Muffler’s 
continuing significance. The real question is whether the 
Court’s analysis of the issues before it suggests that the Court 
is applying a less deferential multifactor or hybrid analysis 
 
with a Department of Transportation case). 
 216. All three of these opinions contain such statements. See United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–28 (2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 217. See, e.g., Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26 (citing Chevron for the proposition 
that “when the statute ‘is silent or ambiguous’ we must defer to a reasonable 
construction by the agency charged with its implementation”); Pharm. Re-
search & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 680 n.4 (2003) (describing the 
Chevron step-two inquiry as “whether the agency construction is reasonable”); 
Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 453 (1999) 
(finding the agency interpretation “within the bounds of reasonable interpre-
tation, and hence entitled to deference under” Chevron); Estate of Cowart v. 
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (citing Chevron for the “funda-
mental principle” of law “requiring judicial deference to a reasonable statutory 
interpretation by an administering agency”). 
 218. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 281 (2003). 
 219. See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 
473, 479, 495, 497 (2002) (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 429 (1977), 
for deferring to “permissible” agency choices and Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 
453 U.S. 34, 43–44 (1981), along with United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, for giving a proposed Health & Human Services regulation “respectful 
consideration”); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (applying 
Chevron and citing Batterton, 432 U.S. at 424–26, for the proposition that the 
Court owes the agency’s interpretation “more than mere deference or weight”); 
Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 89 (1990) (citing Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425, 
along with Chevron and several other pre- and post-Chevron cases). 
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rather than Chevron’s two steps and controlling deference. The 
Cottage Savings220 and Cleveland Indians Baseball221 cases are 
most substantive examples of the Court’s reliance on National 
Muffler. 
The issue in Cottage Savings was whether exchanging one 
portfolio of residential mortgage loans for another represented 
a “disposition of property” under I.R.C. § 1001.222 No regulation 
or pre-litigation ruling addressed the issue precisely; but Treas-
ury Regulation § 1.1001-1 treated an exchange of “properly dif-
fering materially” as a disposition, and, as in National Muffler, 
the Court characterized the case as challenging both the valid-
ity and the meaning of that regulatory language.223 Concerning 
the former question, the Court cited National Muffler princi-
pally in favor of deference to reasonable interpretations.224 
Nevertheless, the Court employed the reenactment doctrine in 
assessing reasonableness.225 The Court noted that its own ju-
risprudence had incorporated the “‘materially’ or ‘essentially’ 
different” standard in the 1920s, that the regulation had em-
ployed that standard since 1934, and that Congress had reen-
acted the Code several times since.226 In discussing deference, 
except when citing the case in deference boilerplate,227 the 
Court typically cites Cottage Savings as support for reenact-
ment doctrine applicability, in both tax and non-tax cases.228 
As already noted, reenactment doctrine figured promi-
nently in pre-Chevron multifactor deference analysis, particu-
 
 220. 499 U.S. 554 (1990). 
 221. United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200 (2001). 
 222. Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 559.  
 223. Id. at 560 (“We must therefore determine whether the realization 
principle in § 1001(a) incorporates a ‘material difference’ requirement. If it 
does, we must further decide what that requirement amounts to and how it 
applies in this case.”). 
 224. Id. at 560 (“Because Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the 
power to promulgate ‘all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of 
[the Internal Revenue Code],’ 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), we must defer to his regula-
tory interpretations of the Code so long as they are reasonable.”). 
 225. See id. at 561–62. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003) (stating that 
general authority regulations must be treated with “deference”); Comm’r v. 
Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 120, 123 (1997) (noting that the Court defers to 
reasonable interpretative Treasury regulations). 
 228. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 
220 (2001); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 434 (2000) (citing Cot-
tage Savings, 499 U.S. at 562, in support of the reenactment doctrine in a non-
tax case); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991) (same). 
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larly in tax cases but also in non-tax ones. That does not neces-
sarily mean that reenactment doctrine is inconsistent with 
Chevron.229 To the extent that the Court often considers legisla-
tive history in ascertaining plain meaning at Chevron step 
one,230 reenactment doctrine may be of use in that task. In FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., for example, the Court 
employed the reenactment doctrine heavily in Chevron step-one 
analysis to conclude that Congress clearly did not intend with 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act to give the FDA authority to 
regulate tobacco.231 Although the reenactment doctrine is in-
consistent with Chevron’s emphasis on interpretive flexibility, 
the Court has also acknowledged the doctrine in connection 
with Chevron step-two analysis.232 Consequently, the analysis 
of Cottage Savings sheds little light on the Chevron versus Na-
tional Muffler debate. 
Cleveland Indians Baseball offers even less to clarify the 
question of deference toward Treasury regulations, notwith-
standing its more extended deference discussion. The issue 
raised by Cleveland Indians Baseball was whether backpay 
awards are “wages” for purposes of FICA and FUTA, the rele-
vant portions of which are incorporated in the Internal Reve-
nue Code and within the interpretive authority of I.R.C. 
§ 7805(a).233 In analyzing the issue, the Court cited National 
Muffler for the proposition that deference is appropriate for 
reasonable Treasury regulations promulgated under I.R.C. 
§ 7805.234 The Court acknowledged that the regulations are 
ambiguous as to the question at hand, noted a long-standing 
revenue ruling that was on point, and cited a case from the 
Seminole Rock line in favor of substantial deference for an 
 
 229. See Caron, supra note 15, at 563–73 (discussing relationship between 
tax, Chevron, and the reenactment doctrine generally); Gans, supra note 20, at 
764–75 (same). 
 230. See e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
133–59 (2000); Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 457–60 (1998); Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 848–53, 862–64 (1984). 
 231. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143–59. 
 232. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226–27 (2002); see also Brown 
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority 
for limiting agency interpretive choice); Robert A. Anthony, Keeping Chevron 
Pure, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 371 (2002) (same). 
 233. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 3101 (FICA), 3111 (FICA), 3121 (FICA), 3301 
(FUTA), 3306 (FUTA) (2000). 
 234. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 
219 (2001). 
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agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. 235 The Court 
then cited Cottage Savings along with pre-Chevron tax juris-
prudence other than National Muffler for the reenactment doc-
trine point that agency interpretations that survive congres-
sional reenactment carry the force and effect of law.236 
Whatever the significance of this analysis for Seminole Rock 
deference or the reenactment doctrine, without stretching the 
rhetoric significantly, it is impossible to discern any clear 
statement concerning the applicability of controlling deference 
versus multifactor respect to Treasury regulations. 
By contrast, the Court was significantly clearer in Atlantic 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner,237 another case that 
post-dates Cottage Savings. That case involved a general au-
thority Treasury regulation interpreting the phrase “reserve 
strengthening” used in I.R.C. § 1023.238 In this opinion, the 
Court cited Chevron and expressly and unequivocally employed 
Chevron’s two-step analysis, concluding first that the statute is 
ambiguous,239 then continued to consider the regulation’s rea-
sonableness.240 The Court did not cite National Muffler, but did 
cite Cottage Savings for the proposition that the Court’s task at 
step two “is to decide, not whether the Treasury Regulation 
represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it 
represents a reasonable one.”241 The Court’s Chevron step-two 
analysis in Atlantic Mutual does not mention reenactment, lon- 
 
 
 235. See id. at 218–19. The Court cites Thomas Jefferson University v. Sha-
lala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994), in favor of substantial deference for an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations. See Cleveland Indians Baseball, 532 U.S. 
at 220. The relevant passage from Thomas Jefferson University makes the 
same point and cites, among other cases, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945), and Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), as sup-
port. See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512; see also discussion supra 
note 85 (discussing Seminole Rock deference). 
 236. See Cleveland Indians Baseball, 532 U.S. at 219–20 (citing Cottage 
Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1990)). The relevant passage in Cot-
tage Savings quotes United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1967), 
which in turn quotes Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938), for the 
point that “Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without 
substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted stat-
utes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect 
of law.” Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 561. 
 237. 523 U.S. 382 (1998). 
 238. Id. at 385–86. 
 239. See id. at 387–89. 
 240. See id. at 389–91. 
 241. Id. at 389. 
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gevity, or contemporaneity, but rather Treasury’s reasonable-
ness in balancing competing policy goals.242 
The taxpayer in Atlantic Mutual named Chevron as provid-
ing the appropriate evaluative standard before the Court.243 By 
contrast, the taxpayers in Cleveland Indians Baseball primar-
ily emphasized that the revenue rulings were not entitled to 
Chevron deference in light of Christensen v. Harris County be-
cause revenue rulings do not carry the force of law.244 The tax-
payers in Cottage Savings did not mention deference at all.245 
In each of these cases, however, the deference discussions in 
the government’s briefs were hedged, offering platitudes and 
string citations supporting deference, sometimes citing both 
Chevron and National Muffler together, without clearly articu-
lating the appropriate reviewing standard.246 Thomas Merrill 
has recalled from his experience as Deputy Solicitor General in 
the late 1980s that, at least at that time, the Solicitor General’s 
Office perceived Chevron as very important in the lower courts 
but vulnerable at the Supreme Court, and so deliberately 
avoided any “direct showdown” over the Chevron doctrine’s ap-
plicability.247 This disclosure goes a long way toward explaining 
both the government’s briefing and the Court’s inconsistency on 
deference to Treasury regulations thus far. 
The best interpretation of the Court’s post-Chevron citation 
of both Chevron and National Muffler is that the Court simply 
has not decided what standard to apply in reviewing Treasury 
regulations. The more recent Boeing Co. v. United States248 at 
 
 242. See id. 
 243. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 13, Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 
523 U.S. 382 (1998) (No. 97-147) 1997 WL 748712. 
 244. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 10, United States v. Cleveland 
Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200 (2001) (No. 00-203) 2001 WL 43587 (citing 
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 585–86 (2000)). 
 245. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 
U.S. 554 (1990) (No. 89-1965) 1990 WL 505730; Reply Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant, Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. 544 (No. 89-1965) 1991 WL 521608. 
 246. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 20, Cleveland Indians Baseball, 
532 U.S. 200 (No. 00-203) 2001 WL 167410; Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 7, 
17, Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 523 U.S. 382 (No. 97-147) 1998 WL 3221; Brief of 
Respondent-Appellee at 13–14, Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. 554 (1990) (No. 89-
1965) 1990 WL 505732. But see Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 
244, at 19–20 (citing Mead briefs and seeming to argue for strong deference for 
revenue rulings, but not citing Chevron). 
 247. Thomas W. Merrill, Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, 19 ADMIN. & 
REG. L. NEWS 1 (1994). 
 248. 537 U.S. 437 (2003). 
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least implicitly supports this conclusion. Boeing concerned the 
validity of a Treasury regulation addressing the accounting for 
research and development expenditures in computing “com-
bined taxable income” for “domestic international sales corpo-
rations” or “DISCs.”249 The government in Boeing argued at 
some length that the regulation was a specific authority regula-
tion and thus legislative in character and entitled to Chevron 
deference.250 In the process, the government cited Chevron and 
Mead as well as Batterton v. Francis.251 Even if the regulation 
were not legislative, however, the government contended that 
the Court’s level of deference would be “extremely high” be-
cause Congress had delegated the primary interpretive author-
ity “to the Commissioner, not to the Courts” and Treasury’s in-
terpretation was a reasonable one.252 The taxpayer and various 
amici curiae all but ignored the government’s argument on that 
point,253 but when pressed by Justices Souter and O’Connor at 
oral argument, the taxpayer asserted that the regulation was a 
general authority regulation and conceded only that the regula-
tion was entitled to some unspecified degree of deference or re-
spect if it was reasonable.254 In the end, the Court acknowl-
edged the specific authority grant, observed that Treasury cited 
Code § 7805 in promulgating the regulation, and opined crypti-
cally that “[e]ven if we regard the challenged regulation as in-
terpretative because it was promulgated under § 7805(a)’s gen-
eral rulemaking grant rather than pursuant to a specific grant 
of authority, we must still treat the regulation with defer-
ence.”255 For this proposition, the Court cited Cottage Savings, 




 249. Id. at 445–46. 
 250. See Brief for the Respondent-Appellee at 20–21, Boeing, 537 U.S. 437 
(Nos. 01–1209, 01–1382). 
 251. See id. 
 252. See id. at 20 (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 
(1967)). 
 253. In its reply brief, the taxpayer cited United States v. Vogel Fertilizer, 
Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26 (1982), for the proposition that the regulation, “whether or 
not . . . thought to be ‘legislative’ in character,” was not entitled to deference 
because it was inconsistent with the statute. Reply Brief for the Petitioner-
Appellant at 18, Boeing, 537 U.S. 437 (No. 01–1209). 
 254. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, 27, Boeing, 537 U.S. 437 (Nos. 
01-1209, 01-1382). 
 255. See Boeing, 537 U.S. at 448. 
 256. See id. 
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It was consistent with the Court’s post-Chevron jurispru-
dence up until Christensen and Mead for the Court to have ig-
nored or glossed through an issue like the level of deference 
appropriate for Treasury regulations.257 Although the post-
Mead Court now is more focused on questions of Chevron’s 
scope, it would nevertheless be typical for the Court to defer 
making a definitive statement until the issue is squarely pre-
sented and adequately briefed. 
Beyond the muddle of the Court’s citation of Chevron and 
National Muffler in tax cases, the ABA Task Force Report par-
ticularly relies heavily on language in Chevron and Mead as 
supporting its bifurcation of deference doctrine between specific 
and general authority Treasury regulations.258 For example, 
the Task Force Report reads Chevron and Mead as requiring 
different degrees of deference for specific authority versus gen-
eral authority regulations because, in the words of the Court, 
exercises of “explicit” delegations are given Chevron-level “con-
trolling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute” but those of “implicit” delegations 
are subject to a more intrusive reasonableness inquiry.259 Al-
though a creative reading of Chevron, the Court has not fol-
lowed this distinction in non-tax cases. Instead, the Court regu-
larly uses the arbitrary and capricious language in discussing 
Chevron and general authority regulations,260 and the Court 
likewise defers to specific authority regulations as reason-
able.261 
The ABA Task Force also discusses at some length the 
Court’s post-Mead opinion in Barnhart v. Walton, a non-tax 
case involving Social Security Administration regulations 
promulgated through notice and comment.262 In an opinion au-
 
 257. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 848–52 (identifying 
numerous circuit splits and open questions concerning Chevron’s scope that 
developed through the 1980s and 1990s). 
 258. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 739. 
 259. See id. at 739 n.59 (quoting and interpreting Chevron and Mead); see 
also Galler, Chevron and Administrative Regulation, supra note 109, at 1795–
96 (reading Chevron step two similarly). 
 260. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 
(2002); Id. at 97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Smiley v. Citibank, N. A., 517 U.S. 
735, 742 (1996); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 528 (1990). 
 261. See, e.g., Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242–43 
(2004); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501–02, 523 (2002); Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333 (2002). 
 262. Barnhart v. Wilson, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
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thored by Justice Breyer, the Court applied Chevron deference 
to uphold the regulations, but in so doing meandered into dicta 
observing that 
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of 
the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the 
statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consid-
eration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time 
all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through 
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at is-
sue.263 
Judges and non-tax scholars have debated whether Justice 
Breyer’s rhetoric signals the relevance of such Skidmore-like 
factors as agency expertise, consistency, and longevity for Chev-
ron analysis.264 The ABA Task Force concludes that, under 
Mead, Chevron and Skidmore clearly espouse different doc-
trines and ultimately describes Barnhart’s significance merely 
as “confusing.”265  
 The best explanation for Barnhart’s discussion of Chevron 
is that, even though Justice Breyer joined the majority’s opin-
ion in Mead, he has long articulated a different vision of Chev-
ron that is not wholly consistent with Mead as understood by 
the Court’s majority.266 For Justice Breyer, Chevron and 
Skidmore do not represent two distinguishable standards of re-
view; instead, Chevron merely adds to traditional Skidmore 
deference “an additional, separate legal reason for deferring to 
certain agency determinations.”267 Other post-Mead opinions of 
the Court demonstrate that the majority of the Court does not 
share Justice Breyer’s view, however.268 In particular, more re-
 
 263.  Id. at 222. 
 264. Compare, e.g., Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (describing Barnhart as “suggest[ing] a merger between Chevron 
deference and Skidmore’s”), with id. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“I do 
not perceive in [Barnhart v.] Walton any ‘merger’ between Chevron and 
Skidmore, which Mead took such pains to distinguish.”); see also John F. 
Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 939 n.227 (2004) 
(recognizing Barnhart’s blurring of Chevron and Skidmore as inconsistent 
with Mead). 
 265. Salem et al., supra note 20, at 755. 
 266. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 472 (2002); Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally 
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 363 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 198–
202 (2006) (discussing Justice Breyer’s view of Chevron). 
 267. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 268. See, e.g., Evans, 536 U.S. at 487 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(criticizing Justice Breyer’s discussion of Chevron as unnecessary dicta and 
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cently in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. 
EPA, the Court noted Barnhart’s mention of longevity before 
expressly rejecting that factor as relevant to Chevron analy-
sis.269 Ultimately, therefore, Barnhart offers little to inform the 
debate over deference to Treasury regulations. 
In sum, while the Court’s rhetoric is sufficiently vague to 
permit multiple outcomes on the question of deference in this 
area, the best reading of the Court’s case law is that it has not 
yet decided the question. In any event, the Court’s post-
Chevron analysis in both tax and non-tax deference cases is de-
void of any hint that the legislative/interpretative distinction 
governs the assessment of Chevron’s applicability. While the 
courts continue to use the legislative and interpretative catego-
ries to describe regulations and assess the applicability of the 
APA’s notice and comment requirements, those categories 
should not be particularly relevant for a Chevron inquiry that 
emphasizes delegation and force of law.270 Yet much of the on-
going debate over Chevron deference for Treasury regulations 
hinges on the interpretative label applied to such regulations 
by the tax community. In particular, those who wish to deny 
Chevron deference to general authority Treasury regulations 
often rely heavily on the Court’s emphasis on the legislative 
versus interpretative distinction in the Vogel Fertilizer and 
Rowan Cos. cases, even though the Court has never cited those 
cases since Chevron except for wholly unrelated propositions.271 
 
inconsistent with Mead); Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 226–27 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing Justice Breyer’s dicta as 
incompatible with Mead); see also Anthony, supra note 232, at 373–74 (noting 
the irreconcilability of Mead and Justice Breyer’s conception of Chevron). 
 269. See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487–88 
(2004) (counseling Skidmore rather than Chevron deference for internal EPA 
guidelines notwithstanding its acknowledged longevity). 
 270. It is possible, however, that there is some overlap in the standards 
applied to evaluate whether a particular regulatory effort is subject to the no-
tice and comment requirements of APA § 553 and whether the resulting regu-
lation carries the force of law. See infra Part III.B. 
 271. Vogel Fertilizer is the only case in which the Supreme Court has cited 
Rowan Cos. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982). The 
Court cited Vogel Fertilizer twice shortly after deciding Chevron, both times in 
non-tax cases. In Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, the Court quoted 
Vogel Fertilizer to counsel “attach[ing] great weight to agency representations 
to Congress” as to statutory meaning where the agency assisted in drafting 
the statute and clearly expressed its interpretation of the law in testimony be-
fore responsible congressional committees. 470 U.S. 768, 788 (1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In Securities Industry Ass’n v. Board of Governors, 
the Court quoted Vogel Fertilizer solely for the proposition that “[j]udicial def-
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4. Summary 
The common understanding of a unique tax deference tra-
dition simply does not accord with the Court’s jurisprudence or 
the pre-Chevron scholarship. The evolution of judicial deference 
principles in the tax and non-tax contexts follows the same 
general path, with significant scholarly comparison and cita-
tion overlap. Moreover, National Muffler is entirely consistent 
with the Court’s other pre-Chevron jurisprudence, particularly 
as the Court grappled with the explosion in policy making 
through regulation in the years immediately preceding Chev-
ron. While it seems clear that the Court is avoiding conclu-
sively resolving the issue of judicial deference toward Treasury 
regulations until clearly asked to do so, the Court’s post-
Chevron jurisprudence does not particularly suggest that the 
Court is inclined to apply any standard other than Chevron or 
Skidmore in the tax context. 
B. THE NORMATIVE CASE 
Irrespective of the merits of the doctrinal case for a tax-
specific approach to judicial deference, tax scholars and practi-
tioners have offered a variety of normative reasons for utilizing 
different deference standards in the tax context.272 Of course, if 
the Chevron doctrine is premised on an assumption that Con-
gress has delegated primary interpretive authority over a stat-
ute to an agency rather than the courts, the normative case for 
Chevron matters little except to persuade Congress to provide 
affirmatively for an alternative standard of review for tax 
cases. 
Because Mead suggests the potential for differences be-
tween agencies and statutes, however, and because tax scholars 
and practitioners have used that hook and the previously noted 
minor rhetorical deviations from Chevron to open a door for a 
tax-specific deference approach, the argument against such an 
alternative must address the normative as well as the doc-
trinal. Moreover, Skidmore is permissive and prudential, not 
mandatory, and gives the courts flexibility to grant more or less  
 
 
erence to an agency’s interpretation of a statute only sets the framework for 
judicial analysis; it does not displace it.” 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Court has not cited either Vogel Fertilizer or 
Rowan Cos. in any post-Chevron tax case for any proposition whatsoever. 
 272. See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 122, at 54–55, 67–68; Salem et al., su-
pra note 20, at 737–50. 
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deference where it applies. Consequently, normative arguments 
for or against deference carry greater weight to the extent 
Skidmore provides the appropriate standard. 
Normative justifications abound for judicial deference in 
administrative law cases generally and for Chevron particu-
larly, whether tax or otherwise. The Chevron opinion speaks of 
the greater substantive expertise and political accountability of 
agencies over courts.273 Skidmore and National Muffler express 
similar sentiments, although their standards necessarily pay 
less heed to these goals by shifting more interpretive power to 
the courts.274 Given that the Supreme Court hears fewer than 
100 cases per year, respecting agencies as primary statutory in-
terpreters, as Chevron does, should yield greater uniformity of 
interpretation.275 On the other hand, Chevron represents a cer-
tain pro-agency bias in judicial review that makes many people 
uncomfortable absent robust judicial review.276 The virtues and 
vices of the Chevron regime apply universally, however, and 
alone are inadequate support for a separate tax deference stan-
dard. When comparing tax and non-tax practices, the norma-
tive case for applying different deferent standards in the tax 
context finds little support. 
1. Tradition as Normative Argument 
The emphasis of so many of the players in this debate on 
tradition to some degree renders that argument normative as 
well as doctrinal.277 The notion of implicit congressional delega-
tion is admittedly a fictional one, as Congress most likely gives 
little if any consideration to deference doctrine in drafting stat-
utes.278 If the tax community generally perceives there to be a 
 
 273. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 865–66 (1984). 
 274. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476–77 
(1979); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). 
 275. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some 
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118–29 (1987). 
 276. See discussion supra notes 13, 19–20. 
 277. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 86. 
 278. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 50, at 2132; Michael Herz, The 
Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 297, 320 (2004) 
(criticizing the congressional delegation theory of deference on several 
grounds); Scalia, supra note 52, at 516. But see James T. O’Reilly, Deference 
Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review 
Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1980) (discussing the failed attempt pre-
Chevron to amend the APA to curtail judicial deference toward agency legal 
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unique tax deference tradition that requires less deference in 
tax cases than in those from other areas of administrative law, 
then one could argue that Congress drafts the tax laws with 
that same tradition in mind.279 
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that a 
clear, universally recognized tax tradition exists, when in fact 
that is not the case. Putting aside the doctrinal history outlined 
above, scholars and the courts are divided over the appropriate 
level of deference to Treasury regulations as well as the extent 
and significance of any independent tax deference tradition.280 
The circuit split alone should be prima facie evidence against 
relying on tradition as a basis for denying Chevron deference to 
Treasury regulations. Moreover, while Treasury characterizes 
most of its regulations as interpretative with respect to APA 
notice and comment procedures, among other things,281 Treas-
ury also characterizes even regulations promulgated pursuant 
to Code § 7805 as legislative for purposes of claiming Chevron 
deference in briefs to the Court.282 
The only tradition that the tax community truly seems to 
embrace is labeling specific authority Treasury regulations 
“legislative” and general authority ones “interpretative.” Be-
yond that, there is no agreement as to the significance of those 
labels. Absent a more meaningful consensus, tradition alone is 
an inadequate basis for a different tax deference standard. 
 
interpretations, which suggests some congressional recognition of deference 
principles). 
 279. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 86. 
 280. See supra Parts I.C–D. 
 281. Treasury also has employed the interpretative rule characterization to 
avoid Regulatory Flexibility Act requirements for legislative regulations. The 
Regulatory Flexibility Act requires, among other things, that agencies engag-
ing in notice-and-comment rulemaking under APA, § 553, evaluate their regu-
lations for their consequences to small businesses and explain their reasons 
for rejecting less burdensome alternatives. See Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical 
Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213 (analyzing the 
Act); see also infra Part III.A (discussing tax context history and application of 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act). 
 282. For example, in Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003), the 
Court observed that the Treasury promulgated the regulation at issue, 26 
C.F.R. § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979), pursuant to its authority under I.R.C. § 7805(a) 
(2000). See 537 U.S. at 447–48 (citing Proposed Rules, Dep’t of Treasury, 41 
Fed. Reg. 49,160 (Nov. 1976)). In its brief before the Court, however, Treasury 
claimed that the regulation was legislative and thus entitled to Chevron defer-
ence. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 20–21, Boeing, 537 U.S. 437 (Nos. 
01-1209, 01-1382). 
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2. Penalty Severity 
Some who support different deference standards in the tax 
context suggest that the severity of the penalties imposed for 
taking a tax position contrary to that of a Treasury regulation 
makes civil tax enforcement comparable to criminal cases,283 
where Chevron deference is considered inappropriate.284 Given 
the harshness of these potential civil penalties, the exceptional-
ists contend that, at most, a diluted version of Chevron should 
apply to general authority Treasury regulations.285 
Chevron’s inapplicability in criminal cases has little if any-
thing to do with the potential penalties imposed upon convic-
tion, however. Certainly, the severity of criminal sanctions is 
relevant to the interpretation of criminal statutes. Recognizing 
the stakes in criminal cases, the Court has long applied the 
rule of lenity, construing criminal statutes narrowly in favor of 
the alleged violator.286 The decision not to apply Chevron in the 
criminal context, however, is due more to the perception that 
the courts, and not the Justice Department, are responsible for 
administering the criminal code rather than concerns over the 
severity of criminal punishment.287 By contrast, with Chevron, 
the Court has accepted congressional delegation of primary 
administrative authority over complex regulatory structures to 
the agencies rather than the courts. 
Moreover, the penalties imposed on straying taxpayers 
 
 283. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 724 & n.17. To be clear, neither the 
ABA Task Force Report nor this Article addresses Chevron in the context of 
criminal tax evasion or fraud cases. Both consider only Chevron in the civil tax 
context. 
 284. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[W]e have never thought that the interpretation of those charged 
with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference.”); Seneca-Cayuga 
Tribe of Okla. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1031 (10th Cir. 
2003) (“Because the Johnson Act is a federal criminal statute enforced by the 
United States Department of Justice, we owe no deference to the NIGC’s con-
struction.”); United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(supporting same); see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal 
Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996) (acknowledging the proposition 
despite arguing in favor of Chevron’s application in the criminal context). 
 285. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 724 & n.17. 
 286. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 
(1992); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213 (1985); see also Zachary 
Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 
885–86 (2004); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 57, 58 (1998). 
 287. See Crandon, 494 U.S. at 177–78 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Ka-
han, supra note 284, at 490. 
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simply are not so onerous comparatively. Admittedly, the pen-
alties and interest charges that may be levied against a tax-
payer who underreports his or her income tax liability can be 
burdensome. I.R.C. § 6662 imposes a penalty of twenty percent 
on any underpayment of taxes resulting from taxpayer negli-
gence as well as intentional disregard of tax rules and regula-
tions,288 and I.R.C. § 6662 and related Treasury regulations 
construe negligence broadly.289 Separately, the Code requires 
taxpayers who underpay their taxes to pay interest on assessed 
and unpaid taxes.290 With daily compounding, it is not unusual 
for such penalties and interest to exceed the amount of tax due. 
Burdensome as the Code’s civil penalties may be, across 
the administrative law spectrum, there are many instances of 
agencies administering statutes carrying severe financial pen-
alties and receiving Chevron deference for their interpretations 
of those statutes. In the environmental context, for example, 
the Safe Drinking Water Act gives the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency significant rulemaking authority to establish safe 
thresholds for drinking water contaminants.291 Violators of the 
EPA’s regulations are subject to civil penalties of up to $25,000 
per day until the violation is remedied.292 Nevertheless, the 
 
 288. See I.R.C. §§ 6662(a)–(b) (2000). 
 289. “Negligence” for these purposes includes “any failure to make a rea-
sonable attempt to comply with the provisions of ” the Code. I.R.C. § 6662(c). A 
taxpayer will not be assessed an underpayment penalty for taking a position 
on his or her tax return that has a “reasonable basis”; but where the govern-
ment’s contrary interpretation of the Code is advanced by a Treasury regula-
tion, “[t]he reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that 
is merely arguable or that is merely a colorable claim.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
3(b)(1), (3) (as amended in 2003). For a return position contrary to a Treasury 
regulation to have a reasonable basis, the position must be supported by some 
other Treasury or IRS regulation, ruling, or pronouncement. See Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.6662-3(b)(3), 1.6662-4(d) (as amended in 2003). In short, unless the gov-
ernment has issued contradictory interpretations of the Code, a taxpayer who 
disagreed with a Treasury regulation’s interpretation of the Code, and takes a 
contrary but colorable position on a tax return, is subject to the twenty percent 
underpayment penalty in the event that the taxpayer either elects not to con-
test a deficiency assessment or has his or her position rejected by the courts. 
Notably, the reasonable basis standard is provided only by the Treasury De-
partment itself through regulation and not by Congress or the Code. Theoreti-
cally, therefore, the reasonable basis standard is itself subject to judicial re-
view. That said, to date, it appears that no one has raised such a challenge. 
 290. See I.R.C. §§ 6601(a), 6621(a)(2), 6622 (2000). The Code also imposes 
interest on the twenty percent underpayment penalty from the date of as-
sessment until payment. See id. § 6601(e)(2) (2000). 
 291. See 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2000). 
 292. See id. § 300g-3(3)(A). 
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courts have applied Chevron deference to EPA’s safe drinking 
water regulations.293 
The severity of financial penalties in any sort of enforce-
ment action is entirely relative, depending upon one’s financial 
status; but in the civil context, financial penalties in enforce-
ment actions may be the least bad consequence of regulations. 
Agency rulemakings regularly entitled to Chevron deference 
can alter the structure of entire industry segments, resulting in 
substantial and potentially negative economic implications for 
at least some regulated parties.294 The Court has applied Chev-
ron deference to EEOC regulations interpreting the Americans 
with Disabilities Act that operate to deny employment to work-
ers.295 Agencies adopt regulations that interpret statutes to 
deny welfare or disability or retirement benefits—basic subsis-
tence means—to arguably eligible recipients, yet the Court does 
not hesitate to apply Chevron in evaluating such regulations.296 
Finally, the Court regularly applies Chevron deference in 
immigrant deportation cases. Having compared deportation to 
criminal sanction,297 the Court employs the rule of lenity in 
evaluating the deportation provisions of immigration stat-
 
 293. See City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 294. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
125 S. Ct. 2688, 2712 (2005) (upholding the FCC determination that cable mo-
dem services are not subject to regulation under the Telecommunications Act); 
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 539 (2002) (upholding local 
competition regulations promulgated by the FCC under the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 15–16, 28 (2002) (upholding 
FERC regulations imposing open access requirements on owners of electricity 
transmission lines). 
 295. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84–85 (2002) (up-
holding an EEOC regulation interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act 
as allowing employers to refuse to hire someone where the employment in 
question would endanger the worker’s health). 
 296. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (upholding Social 
Security Administration regulations and denying benefits); Black & Decker 
Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831 (2003) (recognizing that Labor De-
partment regulations interpreting the Employment Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974 are entitled to Chevron deference); Pauley v. BethEnergy 
Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (deferring under Chevron to an agency 
interpretation denying Black Lung benefits); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 
377 n.3 (1987) (applying Chevron to the denial of AFDC benefits). 
 297. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 132 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“Deportation is the equivalent of banishment or exile. Though technically not 
criminal, it practically may be.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Reid v. 
INS, 420 U.S. 619, 633–34 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging 
same); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (originating this view). 
HICKMAN_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:34:36 AM 
2006] THE NEED FOR MEAD 1595 
 
utes,298 and occasionally that doctrine may trump Chevron.299 
Nevertheless, because it is clear that Congress has delegated to 
the executive branch the primary responsibility for administer-
ing the immigration laws, the Court also extends Chevron def-
erence to interpretations rendered through adjudication before 
the Board of Immigration Appeals.300 
Perhaps the concern is not so much the economic impact of 
the Code’s penalties as the perception that the tax laws are 
uniquely individual in their application. While immigrant de-
portation cases are similarly individual in nature, one could ar-
gue that areas like environmental law, energy, or telecommuni-
cations are less personal and more neutral, pursued for the 
broader public good, and not necessarily adverse to regulated 
parties. 
It is possible to characterize tax in such a broad, neutral 
manner as well. Taxes are not imposed for their own sake but 
rather to pay for government programs. Taxpayers may dis-
agree over whether one program or another is worth the price 
paid; but as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes notoriously ob-
served, “taxes are what we pay for civilized society.”301 Con-
versely, other areas that strike some people as neutrally pursu-
ing the public good may be strikingly individualistic in 
application. The farmer who is denied access to the water sup-
ply for his crops in order to protect an endangered species of 
fish is likely to consider the Secretary of the Interior’s interpre-
tation of the Endangered Species Act highly personal,302 re-
gardless of the benefits to the general public. 
In short, in both absolute and relative terms, as bad as 
penalties and interest for underpayment of taxes may be, the 
Court applies Chevron to agency interpretations with far worse 
potential consequences. Whether or not an argument can be 
made generally for denying Chevron deference where the same 
agency is charged both with primary interpretation and en-
forcement responsibilities, the potential severity of tax penal-
 
 298. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Reid, 420 
U.S. at 633–34; Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10; see also Brian G. Slocum, The 
Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 
519–21 (2003). 
 299. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 & n.45 (2001). 
 300. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999); Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448–49. 
 301. Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal 
Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 302. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
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ties is simply inadequate justification for employing a diluted 
version of Chevron or other alternative deference standard in 
the tax context. 
3. IRS Overreach 
Yet another argument raised by those in favor of a differ-
ent judicial deference approach in tax cases emphasizes the na-
ture of the tax-collection function.303 The primary function of 
Treasury tax personnel and the IRS is to collect government 
revenues; and in light of this goal, Treasury and the IRS may 
be biased toward revenue maximization and may adopt regula-
tions and rulings that test the boundaries of reasonableness in 
pursuit of that goal.304 
The perception of antitaxpayer, revenue-maximizing bias 
in the drafting of rules and regulations, while common, is 
largely inaccurate. Although Treasury inevitably adopts some 
regulations that lean toward greater revenue collection, other 
regulations are strikingly pro-taxpayer. The recently-adopted 
intangibles capitalization regulations interpreting Code § 263 
and the Court’s decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner305 
 
 303. See, e.g., Salem et al., supra note 20, at 724–25. 
 304. Mitchell Gans raises a similar but slightly different argument, sug-
gesting that the Treasury’s “position as the taxpayer’s adversary in tax litiga-
tion” will produce anti-taxpayer bias in the Treasury’s legal interpretation. 
Gans, supra note 20, at 758. As others have done with respect to penalties, as 
discussed supra Part II.B.2. Gans compares tax litigation to criminal prosecu-
tion on this point. See Gans, supra note 20, at 758. The analysis offered in Part 
II.B.2 applies with equal force to Gans’s assertion here. Many, if not most, 
agencies engage in both rulemaking and civil enforcement functions while en-
joying Chevron deference for their regulations. As in most such agencies, the 
IRS is organized so that the lawyers responsible for drafting regulations and 
those responsible for enforcement and litigation report to different people, al-
though the Chief Counsel is ultimately responsible for both. See SALTZMAN, 
supra note 1, ¶ 1.02[4][a]; INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 24, § 1.1.6 
(Feb. 1999) If anything, the tax area offers an additional built-in check against 
such alleged interpretive bias in that the IRS coordinates tax litigation with 
the Department of Justice’s Tax Division as well as with the Treasury De-
partment, although the IRS plays a prominent role in both regulation drafting 
and enforcement. See SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 1.02[4][a]; INTERNAL REVE-
NUE MANUAL, supra note 24, § 34.2.1 (May 1990). Regardless, the courts have 
long refused to find bias inherent in the performance of both rulemaking and 
enforcement tasks by agencies; and it is more likely that Treasury and IRS 
officials would draft regulations with an eye toward avoiding litigation rather 
than inviting litigation by exceeding their authority. See generally Michael 
Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981). 
 305. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
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are widely hailed as surprisingly taxpayer friendly.306 The 
check-the-box entity classification regulations for distinguish-
ing “partnerships” from “associations” for purposes of I.R.C. 
§ 7701.307 
Even if suspicions of revenue-maximizing behavior were 
valid, there can be no question that generating revenue for gov-
ernment use is a primary function of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Revenue maximization is not Congress’s only goal with 
the Code, to be sure; and reasonable people can, and do, dis-
agree over how to balance the Code’s competing objectives. It is 
far from clear, therefore, that interpreting ambiguities in the 
Code with an eye toward generating more revenue is per se il-
legitimate—so long as Treasury keeps its regulatory interpre-
tations within the range of statutorily permissible alternatives. 
Chevron’s two steps operate to constrain Treasury at least that 
much; and within that spectrum of permissibility, it seems 
more appropriate for Treasury rather than the courts to decide 
whether or not revenue maximization should be the policy em-
phasis. 
Moreover, allegations of this sort of jurisdictional boundary 
testing are not limited to the tax context. Many agencies other 
than the IRS have been known to test the boundaries of the 
statutes they administer, whether in the pursuit of policy goals 
agency officials deem wise if perhaps beyond the range of their 
mandate,308 or for reasons as base as financial self-interest.309 
“The desire of power in excess, caused the angels to fall.”310 On 
 
 306. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4, 1.263(a)-5 (as amended in 2004); see also 
Sharon Burnett & Darlene Pulliam, IRS Provides Much-Needed Guidance on 
Capitalization of Intangibles, PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Aug, 2004, at 68, 80 
(“The release of these final regulations places taxpayers in a better position 
concerning the capitalization of intangibles than they have ever been.”). 
 307. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701–1 to –3 (as amended in 2006). 
 308. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps. of 
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (seeking jurisdiction over abandoned sand and 
gravel pit as “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act); FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (seeking jurisdiction to regu-
late tobacco as a drug). 
 309. See, e.g., Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (considering an agency interpretation of a contract to which the 
agency was a party); Mesa Air Group, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 87 F.3d 498 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); see also Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference 
and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203 (2004) (categoriz-
ing and discussing the cases). 
 310. SIR FRANCIS BACON, Of Goodness & Goodness of Nature, in THE ES-
SAYS OR COUNSELS, CIVIL AND MORAL, OF FRANCIS LD. VERULAM 51, 51 
(1944). 
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the other hand, it is not unheard of for agencies to decline to 
regulate subject matter arguably within their jurisdiction, 
which may be equally problematic depending upon one’s per-
spective.311 
At times the Court has recognized in non-tax cases the di-
lemma of applying Chevron deference to agency interpretations 
that raise questions about the scope of, and limitations on, an 
agency’s congressionally delegated authority.312 However the 
courts ultimately resolve the issue of Chevron in the context of 
agency jurisdiction questions, at a minimum, the potential for 
Treasury and the IRS to push statutory limits and behave in a 
self-interested fashion is not unique and thus should not be re-
lied upon to justify an alternative deference standard in the tax 
context. As with any other agency, the Chevron standard by its 
own terms allows courts to restrain Treasury within the 
boundaries of its delegated authority and reject arbitrary action 
by Treasury. The revenue-maximizing effect of Treasury regu-
lations within the scope of delegated authority is a policy mat-
ter better addressed through the political process. 
4. Expertise 
Courts and tax scholars would never suggest that Internal 
Revenue Code interpretation requires no special expertise. In-
deed, the Court’s own cases are littered with references to 
Treasury and IRS expertise when it comes to interpreting the 
tax laws.313 In discussing this Article with a non-tax colleague, 
 
 311. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005) (involving FCC declining jurisdiction to regulate cable 
modem services). 
 312. In Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, for example, 
Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that “[a]gencies do not ‘administer’ 
statutes confining the scope of their jurisdiction, and such statutes are not ‘en-
trusted’ to agencies.” 487 U.S. 354, 386–87 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Justice Scalia responded in a concurring opinion that many, if not most, 
agency interpretations raise questions regarding the scope of the agency’s au-
thority. See id. at 377–81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, he 
concluded, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish garden-variety 
statutory interpretations from those with jurisdictional implications. See id. at 
381–82. More recently, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., after 
rejecting the FDA’s effort to interpret the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as giv-
ing it unprecedented jurisdiction over the tobacco industry on Chevron step-
one grounds, the Court in dicta suggested drawing such a line at “extraordi-
nary cases.” 529 U.S. at 159. 
 313. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 
200, 219 (2001); Comm’r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 127 (1997) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 
HICKMAN_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:34:36 AM 
2006] THE NEED FOR MEAD 1599 
 
however, an interesting question arose concerning whether in 
fact Treasury and the IRS possess superior expertise over the 
courts in interpreting the Code. 
In some complex regulatory areas, making policy choices 
requires an evaluation of scientific, engineering, or other tech-
nical data that are beyond the experience and understanding of 
the average Article III judge. The Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, for example, are all agencies whose 
responsibilities fuse the law with more scientific disciplines. 
Given the agencies’ comparatively greater expertise in these 
cross-disciplinary areas, it makes sense both that Congress 
would delegate substantial policy authority to the agencies and, 
consequently, would prefer the agencies to be the primary in-
terpreters of the statutes under their administration. General-
ist courts lacking scientific or technical training likewise should 
be more inclined to defer to the agencies’ interpretations of 
such statutes. 
Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, by contrast, 
rarely, if ever, requires cross-disciplinary scientific or technical 
expertise. Meanwhile, as James Landis famously argued, de-
spite their generalist profile, appellate courts are particularly 
adept at interpreting statutes.314 So if statutory interpretation 
does not implicate issues informed by special non-legal training 
and expertise, then are judges not just as capable as any other 
attorney to interpret the statute, and is Chevron appropriate in 
such a context? 
Of course, it is common knowledge that, for many attor-
neys (and thus many judges), the financial and economic mat-
ters that dominate the Internal Revenue Code are as incom-
prehensible as the scientific aspects inherent in many 
environmental, food and drug, or energy law issues. Moreover, 
other areas of administrative law where Chevron regularly ap-
plies, such as immigration or securities law, do not require sci-
entific or other technical training; and not every interpretation 
of the Endangered Species Act or the Food, Drug, and Cosmet-
ics Act requires scientific expertise. 
Regardless, emphasizing only the scientific or technical as-
pect of some fields ignores the sometimes overwhelming com-
plexity inherent in most modern regulatory structures like the 
 
(1979); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877). 
 314. JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154–55 (1938). 
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Internal Revenue Code. Many tax cases require expertise in 
understanding the relationships between several or even doz-
ens of Code provisions and their implications for complex 
transactional settings and structures. For example, it takes the 
average tax attorney years to understand the relationships be-
tween the consolidated return regulations under I.R.C. § 1502 
and I.R.C. § 382 and the reorganization provisions and their 
regulations, or the regulations governing the allocation of items 
of income and deduction among partners in Subchapter K of 
the Code.315 Even more discrete issues may reflect significant 
theoretical complexity, as evidenced by the number of Supreme 
Court cases in the 1990s dealing with the exclusion from gross 
income of personal injury damages316 or the Court’s considera-
tion of how to treat nonrecourse debt upon the disposition of 
the property it encumbers.317 If anything, following the delega-
tion premise for Chevron articulated in Mead, the expertise 
necessary in interpreting the Code merely justifies imputing to 
Congress the decision to grant Treasury such broad, primary 
interpretative authority. 
5. Summary 
As with the doctrinal case, the normative claims of tax ex-
ceptionalism have limited persuasive value when tax practices 
are compared with the practices and jurisprudence involving 
other areas of administrative law. When examined in broader 
context, the claims that “tax is different” simply ring hollow. 
Whatever the criticisms and potentially negative implications 
of the deference model articulated by Chevron, Skidmore, and 
Mead, those ramifications are not limited to nor exacerbated in 
the tax context. For all of these reasons, tax does not warrant 
its own, unique deference regime, whether based on National 
Muffler or otherwise. 
III.  APPLYING THE MEAD FRAMEWORK 
Once one accepts that Chevron and Skidmore are the only 
two deference alternatives and that Mead offers the appropri-
 
 315. See I.R.C., § 1502 (2000); id. § 382; id. §§ 701–77.  
 316. See, e.g., O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 82 (1996); Comm’r v. 
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 
(1992). 
 317. See Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 308–12 (1983); Crane v. Comm’r, 
331 U.S. 1, 3–16 (1947). See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual: the 
Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 44 TAX L. REV. 401 (1989). 
HICKMAN_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:34:36 AM 
2006] THE NEED FOR MEAD 1601 
 
ate framework for choosing between them, resolving the appro-
priate standard for Treasury regulations should be fairly sim-
ple. As noted previously, Mead’s holding clearly articulates a 
two-part test for evaluating whether a particular agency inter-
pretation is entitled to Chevron deference or only Skidmore re-
spect.318 The first inquiry is whether “Congress delegated au-
thority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force 
of law.”319 The second question is whether “the agency interpre-
tation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of 
that authority.”320 A particular agency action only qualifies for 
Chevron deference if the answer to both questions is affirma-
tive.321 Otherwise, Skidmore offers the appropriate evaluative 
standard. 
While Mead clearly attempts to add structure to the ques-
tion of Chevron’s scope, Mead’s holding nevertheless contains 
its own analytical holes.322 At a minimum, the framework ar-
ticulated in Mead leaves open for further consideration two ma-
jor questions: how should the courts determine whether Con-
gress has delegated to an agency the requisite administrative 
authority;323 and even if the requisite delegation exists, which 
interpretive processes represent exercises of such congression-
ally delegated authority?324 Both questions turn on the “force of 
law” concept, a vague concept for which the Court has provided 
only minimal guidance.325 
 
 318. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also 
supra notes 7, 58 and accompanying text. 
 319. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See id.; see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 813 (describing the Mead 
test). 
 322. As with Chevron, Mead has been the subject of extensive scholarly 
criticism. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 225–34 (describing the harms threatened by 
Mead’s framework); Jordan, supra note 7, at 725–26 (noting that Mead fails to 
identify which types of agency decisions are implicated); John Manning, 
Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 939 n.229 (2004) (describing 
several criticisms of Mead); Vermeule, supra note 7, at 355 (speculating about 
the heavy burdens of implementing Mead). 
 323. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 470, 576–90 (noting and at-
tempting to address this issue); Vermeule, supra note 7, at 349–55 (examining 
the D.C. Circuit’s reaction to this ambiguity). 
 324. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Three Settings in Which Nonlegislative 
Rules Should Not Bind, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2001) (discussing types 
of agency action); Merrill, supra note 8,, at 830–32 (same). 
 325. See Elhauge, supra note 50, at 2139; Merrill, supra note 8, at 826–27; 
Sunstein, supra note 266, at 222–25. 
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Whatever the ambiguities of the force of law concept, and 
the related uncertainties in truly marginal cases, applying 
Mead to Treasury regulations is comparatively simple. Treas-
ury regulations promulgated pursuant to the Code’s specific 
and general rulemaking grants bind both taxpayers and the 
government with the same legal force as the Code itself. This 
simple reality is enough to satisfy Mead and compel Chevron 
deference to Treasury regulations. 
A. EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
The Mead Court was quite explicit that a specific grant of 
rulemaking authority and exercise thereof will satisfy the force 
of law requirement: “We have recognized a very good indicator 
of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congres-
sional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or 
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which def-
erence is claimed.”326 Congress has clearly delegated to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury the specific authority to promulgate leg-
islative regulations in a variety of areas throughout the 
Code.327 Even before Chevron, the Court extended strong judi-
cial deference to such regulations.328 Thus it is not surprising 
that even those who support alternative tax-deference stan-
dards concede Chevron’s applicability to specific authority regu-
lations.329  
The remaining question is whether general authority 
Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) 
are entitled to Chevron deference as well or only Skidmore re-
spect. As already noted, Treasury routinely utilizes APA notice- 
and-comment rulemaking in promulgating these regulations, 
but insists that such regulations are interpretative and that 
notice and comment are not required.330 Nevertheless, Treas-
ury treats general authority regulations as legally binding both 
 
 326. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–30. 
 327. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (identifying specific author-
ity grants). 
 328. See Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (ac-
knowledging the standard); see also supra notes 150–54 and accompanying 
text. 
 329. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 81–82; Salem et al., supra note 20, 
at 737–38. But see Gans, supra note 20, at 792–93 (calling for legislation to 
mandate Skidmore deference for specific authority Treasury regulations). 
 330. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 24, § 32.1.2.3; Salem et 
al., supra note 20, at 728; see also discussion supra note 30 (discussing Treas-
ury’s overreliance on its I.R.C. § 7805 authority). 
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taxpayers and the government; and, as discussed at length 
above, I.R.C. § 6662 imposes financial penalties on taxpayers 
who fail to follow Treasury’s interpretations of the Code as ad-
vanced through general as well as specific authority regula-
tions. 
Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts have argued in 
favor of equating Mead’s force of law requirement with the gen-
eral authority to promulgate binding “rules and regulations” 
and sanctions for the violation of such rules and regulations by 
the regulated party.331 Merrill and Watts offer extensive his-
torical justification for such a rule as representing the best 
across-the-board indicator of the congressional delegation nec-
essary for Chevron deference.332 The delegation to the Secretary 
of the Treasury of the authority to “prescribe all needful rules 
and regulations,” coupled with the sanctions imposed by I.R.C. 
§ 6662, seems quite to fit that bill.333 
Interestingly, however, Merrill and Watts present a survey 
of historical evidence against applying their convention to gen-
eral authority Treasury regulations adopted pursuant to I.R.C. 
§ 7805(a).334 They catalogue early debates over whether the 
general authority grant of § 7805(a)’s predecessor would be 
binding upon taxpayers and the repeated rejection of an 
amendment by Senator Deal denying such weight to regula-
tions promulgated under § 7805(a).335 Merrill and Watts specu-
late that the rejection could mean that most legislators under-
stood that general authority Treasury regulations promulgated 
under § 7805(a) would not carry the force and effect of law.336 
 
 331. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 471–72. 
 332. See id. at 493–528. 
 333. I.R.C. §§ 6662, 7805(a) (2000). 
 334. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 570–73. 
 335. See id. 
 336. See id. Merrill and Watts also premise their argument on their char-
acterization of early income tax penalties as applying only to specific authority 
grants in the I.R.C. See id. at 571–73. I believe that Merrill and Watts have 
misconstrued the early tax penalty provisions. Merrill and Watts focus their 
analysis largely on the rulemaking grants and penalty provisions in sections 
1001 through 1005 of the War Revenue Act of 1917, although they correctly 
note similar rulemaking grants in subsequent Revenue Acts and ascribe the 
same penalty structure to the Internal Revenue Codes of 1939 and 1954. See 
id. Sections 1001 and 1002 of the War Revenue Act of 1917 give Treasury the 
authority to promulgate regulations governing the keeping of records, filing of 
returns, and payment of taxes. See War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-
271, sections 1001, 1002, 40 Stat. 300, 325 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 71–77). Merrill and Watts characterize regulations under sections 1001 and 
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Merrill and Watts link this history to the tax community’s 
practice of applying the interpretative label to such regula-
tions.337 When considered in conjunction with the understand-
ing of the nondelegation doctrine common to that era, their 
speculation seems quite plausible. 
Whatever the original understanding, however, more re-
cent events speak to the contrary. Since the Court decided 
Chevron, Congress has repeatedly broadened and increased the 
penalties for failure to adhere to Treasury regulations in filing 
a tax return. In 1986, Congress rephrased and expanded the 
scope of the negligence penalty provision to make clear that 
even an unintentional failure to adhere to Treasury’s “rules 
and regulations” would be subject to penalties.338 Subsequently, 
 
1002 as specific authority regulations, see Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 
571; but while the early Revenue Acts included several specific grants of au-
thority to issue substantive regulations, see supra notes 131–32 and accompa-
nying text, the regulations under sections 1001 and 1002 are regarded gener-
ally as procedural rather than legislative in character. Meanwhile, section 
1004 imposes penalties only for intentional fraud and for failure to file a re-
turn, but not for failure to adhere to regulations, whether specific or general, 
in computing taxes owed. See War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 
§ 1004, 40 Stat. 300, 325 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71–77); see also 
Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties—“They Shoot Dogs, Don’t They?”, 43 
FLA. L. REV. 811, 830–31, 837 (1991) (detailing penalty provision history). By 
contrast, § 250(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 specifically adopted an admit-
tedly minimal and rarely imposed five percent civil penalty for “negligence,” 
which was expanded by the Revenue Act of 1921 to “negligence or intentional 
disregard of authorized rules and regulations,” where a taxpayer is subse-
quently assessed additional taxes. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 
§250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71–77); 
Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, §250(b), 42 Stat. 227, 264–65 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71–77); see also Arnold Hoffman, Intentional Dis-
regard of Rules and Regulations, 28 TAXES 111, 111 (1950) (discussing penalty 
exposure); Winslow, supra, at 837–38. While the negligence provision is not 
textually limited to specific authority regulations, given the common under-
standing of the relationship between general authority regulations and the 
nondelegation doctrine, it is possible that Congress in 1918 and 1921 did not 
intend for the negligence penalty to apply to general authority Treasury regu-
lations. See discussion supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text. 
 337. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 570–73. 
 338. Prior to 1986, the negligence penalty only applied to “intentional dis-
regard of rules and regulations.” Winslow, supra note 336, at 838. Many courts 
have interpreted this language as requiring actual knowledge of and intent to 
ignore the relevant Treasury regulations before penalties would apply. See, 
e.g., Hill v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 225, 251–52 (1974); see also Hoffman, supra note 
336, at 112–13 (documenting early cases). In 1986, Congress expanded the 
negligence penalty to cover “any failure to make a reasonable attempt to com-
ply with” or “any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard” for the Code and 
Treasury regulations. I.R.C. § 6653(a)(3) (1986) (repealed 1989); see also Wins-
low, supra note 336, at 838. 
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in 1989, Congress revisited and entirely restructured the 
I.R.C.’s penalty provisions but left the expanded language of 
the negligence penalty—now called the “accuracy-related pen-
alty”—substantially unaltered.339 It may or may not be fair to 
presume that Congress appreciated the potential consequences 
to judicial deference of using the “rules and regulations” termi-
nology in the penalty provision. It is notable, however, that 
Congress used the same “rules and regulations” language in 
both I.R.C. § 6662 and I.R.C. § 7805(a); and Treasury’s regula-
tions interpreting § 6662 do not distinguish between specific 
authority and general authority Treasury regulations in pre-
scribing § 6662’s applicability.340 
Separately, Congress has had the opportunity to consider 
Treasury’s position that its general authority regulations are 
interpretative for APA purposes. In 1980, Congress adopted the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act341 (RFA), mandating that agencies 
analyze the burdens imposed on small businesses by their pro-
posed regulations and explain the reasons for not adopting less 
onerous alternatives.342 The RFA’s requirements generally only 
apply to informal agency rulemaking subject to the notice and 
comment requirements of APA § 553(b).343 Thus, since interpre-
tative rules are exempt from the APA’s notice and comment re-
quirements, the RFA generally does not apply to them.344 
Based upon its historical categorization of its general authority 
regulations as interpretative, Treasury initially claimed that 
virtually all of its regulations were likewise excused from the 
regulatory flexibility analysis.345 After hearing numerous com-
 
 339. See I.R.C. § 6662(a)–(b) (2000). 
 340. See id. §§ 6662, 7805(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (2000). While Treasury 
also asserts applicability of these penalties for failure to follow less formal 
(and non-legally binding) revenue rulings, Treasury distinguishes revenue rul-
ings from general authority regulations and is more lenient in allowing tax-
payers to avoid penalties in declining to follow revenue rulings. See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.6662–3(b)(2). 
 341. Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 601–12 (2000)). 
 342. See Verkuil, supra note 281, at 219, 229–30. 
 343. See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a); see also id. § 603(a) (1994) (showing original 
statutory language). 
 344. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2000). 
 345. See 142 CONG. REC. E571, E573 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (Extensions 
of Remarks by Rep. Henry J. Hyde) (“Many IRS rulemakings involve ‘interpre-
tative rules’ that IRS contends need not be promulgated pursuant to section 
553 of the Administrative Procedures Act.”); 142 CONG. REC. S2148, S2156 
(Mar. 15, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). 
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plaints from the Small Business Administration and others 
over Treasury’s excuse for ignoring the RFA’s mandate,346 Con-
gress amended the RFA in 1996 to require regulatory flexibility 
analysis for all Treasury regulations published in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, which includes those promulgated pursu-
ant to Code § 7805.347 
The revised RFA and its legislative history are not deter-
minative of the question whether general authority Treasury 
regulations are legislative or interpretative for APA purposes. 
In fact, quite the opposite is the case. The statute does not de-
clare all Treasury regulations to be legislative, but rather pro-
vides: 
In the case of an interpretative rule involving the internal revenue 
laws of the United States, this chapter applies to interpretative rules 
published in the Federal Register for codification in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, but only to the extent that such interpretative rules 
impose on small entities a collection of information requirement.348 
The legislative history to the amendments similarly offers no 
opinions on whether these regulations are in fact interpreta-
tive, but merely acknowledges Treasury’s claim to that effect.349 
The ABA Task Force on Judicial Deference suggests that 
Congress’s choice of approach in amending the RFA is indica-
tive of its view that general authority Treasury regulations are 
in fact interpretative and thus exempt from the Act’s analysis 
absent specific language to the contrary.350 A more plausible 
view is that Congress is content to leave the finer points of the 
 
 346. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S2148, S2151–53 (Mar. 15, 1996) (statement 
of Sen. Bond) (offering letters from small business organizations extending 
support for amendments); Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Business, 
1995 WL 93626 (Mar. 8, 1995) (statement of Johnny C. Finch, Assistant 
Comptroller General, General Government Division).  
 347. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 
§ 241(a)(1), 110 Stat. 847, 864 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808) (2000)); 
142 CONG. REC. E571-01, E573 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (providing as guidance 
to agency officials that “[t]he amendment applies to those IRS interpretative 
rulemakings that are published in the Federal Register for notice and com-
ment and that will be codified in the Code of Federal Regulations” but not 
“less formal IRS publications such as revenue rulings, revenue procedures, 
announcements, publications or private letter rulings.”); 142 CONG. REC. 
S3242-02, S3244–45 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996) (same); see also discussion supra 
note 29 and accompanying text (noting Treasury’s utilization of notice-and-
comment rulemaking even for its general authority regulations). 
 348. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a). 
 349. See 142 CONG. REC. E571, E573 (Mar. 28, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. 
S3242-02, S3244-45 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996). 
 350. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 739. 
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legislative-versus-interpretative distinction to the courts, and 
instead simply wants the desired regulatory flexibility analysis 
to be performed where necessary to accomplish the RFA’s goals, 
and so chose language more precise to that purpose.351 
Nevertheless, to be burdensome on small businesses and 
thus implicate the concerns Congress intended to address with 
the RFA, the qualifying general authority Treasury regulations 
would have to be binding. In other words, they would have to 
carry the force and effect of law.352 If they did not, then Con-
gress’s insistence upon the regulatory flexibility analysis for 
such regulations would be odd. Considered together, the new 
I.R.C. § 6662 penalty provisions and the RFA amendments 
seem to signal clearly that, whatever its reasoning in the 
1920s, Congress now intends for general authority Treasury 
regulations promulgated pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) to carry 
the force and effect of law. 
B. LEGISLATIVE VERSUS INTERPRETATIVE ANALYSIS 
As discussed above, while the Court once relied on the leg-
islative- and interpretative-rule categories in deciding which 
deference standard to apply, the Court’s post-Chevron jurispru-
dence disregards that distinction in determining whether or not 
Chevron applies. Yet much of the ongoing debate over Chevron 
deference for general authority Treasury regulations hinges on 
the interpretative label that the tax community applies to such 
regulations. 
The interpretative-rule category as historically defined in-
cluded regulations promulgated pursuant to general authority 
grants. Yet while nondelegation doctrine principles rendered 
such regulations nonbinding in the first part of the twentieth 
century, the nondelegation doctrine waned as decades passed. 
The years immediately preceding Chevron saw a dramatic in-
 
 351. Notably, summary statements entered into the record to guide agency 
officials as to the amendment’s meaning describe the affected regulations as 
“‘interpretative rules’ that IRS contends need not be promulgated pursuant to 
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.” 142 CONG. REC. E571-01, 
E573 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. S3242, S3244–45 (daily ed. 
Mar. 29, 1996). Both the use of quotation marks to describe the regulations as 
interpretative and the phrase “the IRS contends” support the conclusion that 
Congress did not intend to render judgment as to the proper characterization 
of such regulations. 
 352. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S2148, S2156 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1996) 
(statement of Sen. Bumpers, noting that such regulations “must be observed if 
the business owner wants to avoid a confrontation with the Government”). 
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crease in legally binding regulations adopted under general au-
thority. Hence, the interpretative-rule category as historically 
understood now incorporates both legally binding regulations 
published in the Code of Federal Regulations and nonbinding 
agency guidelines and rulings.353 
Moreover, it was far from obvious even before Mead that 
interpretative rules could not be Chevron-eligible. Chevron it-
self involved an interpretative regulation, or at least a general 
authority regulation, promulgated using notice-and-comment 
rulemaking;354 and the resemblance of general authority 
Treasury regulations to the interpretative regulation at issue 
in Chevron strongly suggests that Chevron deference should 
apply to them, too. Still, pre-Mead, the circuit courts of appeal 
were divided over the question of Chevron deference to inter-
pretative rules, in part as a consequence of the breadth of that 
category.355 Mead’s more specific inquiry into delegated author-
ity should go a long way toward resolving this circuit split by 
refocusing the inquiry away from the legislative and interpre-
tative labels. 
The courts continue to use the legislative and interpreta-
tive categories to describe regulations and assess the applica-
bility of the APA’s notice and comment requirements, however. 
As the Mead Court indicated, agency action can be Chevron-
eligible even without notice and comment, which suggests that 
classifying a regulation as interpretative and thus exempting it 
from the notice-and-comment process is not dispositive for a 
Chevron inquiry that emphasizes delegation and force of law.356 
 
 353. See Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and 
“Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 6–15 (1994); Wil-
liam Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1322–
23, 1323 (2001). 
 354. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 840–41 (1984) (citing Rules & Regulations, EPA, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 
(Oct. 14, 1981)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) (2000) (providing authority). 
 355. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 
181–82 (3d Cir. 1995); Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 
975–76 (6th Cir. 1993). Others courts have declined to do so. See, e.g., S. Ute 
Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod., 119 F.3d 816, 832–33 (10th Cir. 1997); Jacks v. 
Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 985 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997); Massachusetts v. FDIC, 102 
F.3d 615, 621 (1st Cir. 1996); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Pena, 44 
F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 356. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (“[A]s 
significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the 
want of that procedure here does not decide the case . . . .”). 
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The Court’s analysis makes equally clear that legislative regu-
lations developed through notice-and-comment rulemaking are 
entitled to Chevron deference.357 It stands to reason, therefore, 
that if Treasury regulations are properly subject to APA’s no-
tice and comment requirements, then notwithstanding Treas-
ury’s protestations to the contrary, Chevron would provide the 
appropriate standard for judicial review.358 
Of course, Treasury insists that its general authority regu-
lations are interpretative and, thus, that public notice and 
comment are not required under APA § 553. Treasury’s position 
seems at least overbroad. As noted above, Treasury regularly 
cites I.R.C. § 7805(a) as its primary source of authority even 
where a specific authority grant exists; so Treasury’s charac-
terization of such regulations would seem to encompass virtu-
ally all of its regulations, even where a specific grant of author-
ity arguably supports a particular regulatory action.359 
Regardless, despite Treasury’s insistence that its general au-
thority regulations are interpretative, the agency’s characteri-
zation of its own regulations is at most only a “starting point” 
for analyzing their categorization.360 
The Court has been conspicuously silent in elaborating the 
difference between legislative and interpretative rules for APA 
purposes; but the lower courts have developed standards for 
distinguishing the two. The dominant standard, developed by 
the D.C. Circuit in American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & 
Health Administration, emphasizes much like Mead that the 
question is whether the rule at issue carries “the force of law.” 
The court in American Mining Congress offered a four-part in-
quiry for determining whether a rule has a legal effect, consid-
ering (1) whether “in the absence of a legislative rule by the 
agency, the legislative basis for agency enforcement would be 
inadequate”; (2) whether the agency publishes the rule in the 
Code of Federal Regulations; (3) whether the agency has explic-
 
 357. See id. at 230 n.12 (making the point and citing nineteen such cases); 
see also Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002) (emphasizing 
the agency’s use of notice-and-comment rulemaking to adopt a challenged 
regulatory provision). 
 358. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 827–33 (linking legislative rulemaking 
authority and Chevron eligibility). 
 359. See discussion supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 360. See, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 
2003); Mejia-Ruiz v. INS, 51 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Richard J. 
Pierce Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 547, 555 (2000); discussion supra note 23. 
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itly invoked its general legislative authority; and finally, (4) 
whether the rule in question repudiates or amends another leg-
islative rule.361 Although the D.C. Circuit has since modified 
this standard by making publication in the C.F.R. merely non-
dispositive evidence of agency intent,362 the fact that Treasury 
so publishes its general authority regulations would at least 
mitigate if not outweigh its claim that the regulations are in-
terpretative. Certainly many Treasury regulations are suffi-
ciently extensive to be essential for the enforcement actions be-
ing litigated, even if they only purport to clarify undefined 
statutory terms.363 More importantly, given the nondelegation 
doctrine’s decline and prevalent agency reliance on provisions 
like I.R.C. § 7805(a) to adopt legally binding regulations, ex-
press reliance on I.R.C. § 7805(a) would seem inadequate to 
trigger the third American Mining Congress test.364 
At least one circuit uses an older standard known as the 
substantial impact test. The substantial impact test provides 
that a regulation is legislative rather than interpretative if it 
has a substantial impact on regulated parties.365 The test has 
been criticized as overly inclusive.366 Yet the Fifth Circuit still 
applies a variation of the substantial impact test. In Profes-
sionals & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, that court 
 
 361. Am. Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1109–11 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Hemp Indus., 333 F.3d at 1087 (applying 
this standard); N.Y. City Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 13 (2d Cir. 
1995) (same); Pierce, supra note 360, at 556–57 (discussing this standard). 
 362. See Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
 363. See, e.g., Treas Reg. § 1.702-1 (2005) (interpreting the intent of sub-
chapter K—the partnership anti-abuse regulations); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 
to -3 (2000) (interpreting “corporation”—the so-called “check-the-box regula-
tions”); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 
588 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“If the statute or rule to be interpreted is very general . . . 
and the ‘interpretation’ really provides all the guidance, then the latter will 
more likely be a [legislative] regulation.”). Treasury’s propensity for relying on 
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000) even for regulations that arguably are specifically au-
thorized only reinforces this point. See discussion, supra note 30. But see 
Health Ins. Ass’n, 23 F.3d at 423 (“The dividing line . . . is whether implement-
ing regulations are necessary in order to make a statutory scheme fully opera-
tive.”). 
 364. See, e.g., Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2004) (cit-
ing United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719–20 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
 365. See Funk, supra note 353, at 1325–26. 
 366. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Lexington, Tenn. v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 
1185, 1189 n.2 (6th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging the questionability of the sub-
stantial impact test but applying it as appropriate for the case at bar); see also 
Funk, supra note 353, at 1326. 
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asked whether the rule at issue was binding in that it imposed 
“rights and obligations” on regulated parties and also whether 
the rule “leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free to exer-
cise discretion” or, conversely, binds the agency as well as regu-
lated parties.”367 Treasury regulations have always been bind-
ing on government officials, even when most tax scholars 
agreed that such regulations could not bind taxpayers or the 
courts.368 Now that I.R.C. § 6662 and the regulations there-
under clearly impose penalties for disregarding general author-
ity Treasury regulations in filing tax return, such regulations 
impose rights and obligations and are binding on taxpayers and 
the government alike. 
Even some in the tax community who advocate in favor of 
tax exceptionalism nevertheless acknowledge that general au-
thority Treasury regulations are most likely legislative in char-
acter.369 To the extent this is the case, the applicability of Chev-
ron deference should be clear. Post-Mead, it makes no 
difference for purposes of assessing the applicability of Chevron 
deference whether Treasury regulations are legislative or in-
terpretative in character. The relevant inquiry now is whether 
they carry the force and effect of law. 
C. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Arguing in favor of Skidmore respect rather than Chevron 
deference, John Coverdale offers several indicators that Con-
gress would want general authority Treasury regulations to re-
ceive a lesser degree of deference. First, Coverdale emphasizes 
the text and structure of the Code.370 Coverdale argues that, if 
both specific authority and general authority Treasury regula-
tions carry the force of law, and Treasury can achieve the same 
legal result with general authority regulations that it can with 
specific authority regulations, then Congress would not need to 
 
 367. Prof ’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 
(5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 & 
n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also Tex. Sav. & Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Fed. Hous. 
Fin. Bd., 201 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying the test). 
 368. See, e.g., Alvord, supra note 131, at 261; Surrey, supra note 143, at 
557. 
 369. See, e.g., Salem et. al., supra note 20, at 738–39; see also Cunningham 
& Repetti, supra note 3, at 45 (acknowledging that general authority Treasury 
regulations are legislative under general standards but that the tax commu-
nity does not follow this norm). 
 370. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 85–86. 
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enact specific authority grants.371 In other words, giving spe-
cific authority and general authority Treasury regulations the 
same legal weight renders the specific authority grants redun-
dant, according to Coverdale.372 
Coverdale’s argument denies the significance of several 
other provisions of the Code. With I.R.C. § 7801(a), Congress 
assigned to Treasury the responsibility for administering and 
enforcing the tax laws.373 Administration and enforcement nec-
essarily entail interpretation.374 I.R.C. § 7801(a) thus gives 
Treasury sufficient power to issue nonbinding interpretive 
guidance representing its view of the Code’s meaning. Conse-
quently, general authority Treasury regulations issued pursu-
ant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) must represent something more. With 
I.R.C. § 7805(a), Congress expressly gave Treasury the author-
ity to promulgate regulations as needed to enforce the tax laws. 
With I.R.C. § 6662, Congress signaled its intent that such regu-
lations bind taxpayers as well as Treasury. To deny general au-
thority Treasury regulations Chevron deference ignores the 
signal of I.R.C. § 6662 and renders the general authority grant 
of I.R.C. § 7805(a) superfluous. 
Moreover, Coverdale’s argument assumes that Congress 
recognizes all the ambiguities inherent in the Code at the time 
of enactment. Clearly, where Congress intentionally leaves 
statutory gaps for Treasury to fill, it utilizes specific authority 
grants to indicate such intent.375 It is unrealistic to expect Con-
gress to anticipate every ambiguity, however. A better reading 
of I.R.C. § 7805(a)’s general authority grant is as an acknowl-
edgment that unanticipated uncertainties of statutory meaning 
will arise and as a clear statement that Congress prefers 
Treasury, rather than the courts, to be the institution to resolve 
such questions. 
 
 371. See id.; see also Surrey, supra note 143, at 576–77 (making a similar 
argument, though for different reasons). 
 372. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 85–86. 
 373. See I.R.C. § 7801(a) (2000). 
 374. See Lee, supra note 23, at 24. Some scholars would suggest that such 
interpretive power is inherent in the executive, while others maintain that 
congressionally delegated enforcement power must be present. See generally 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 701, 704–13 (summarizing different views of the Constitution’s Article 
II Vesting Clause). Regardless of one’s view of what is required for an execu-
tive department to have the power to interpret a statute within its jurisdic-
tion, it seems clear that Treasury possesses such authority. 
 375. See discussion supra notes 25, 130–31 and accompanying text (identi-
fying specific authority grants). 
HICKMAN_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:34:36 AM 
2006] THE NEED FOR MEAD 1613 
 
Coverdale also identifies the existence of the Tax Court as 
evidence that Congress clearly desires independent rather than 
deferential review for general authority Treasury regula-
tions.376 To support this position, Coverdale cites congressional 
action in 1924 creating the Board of Tax Appeals (the “BTA” or 
“Board”), the predecessor to the modern Tax Court, for the pur-
pose of providing “‘an independent review of the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue’s determination of additional income and 
estate taxes’ before the additional tax could be collected.”377 
Coverdale maintains that the existence of the Tax Court and 
the tax deference standard of National Muffler (which Cover-
dale equates with Skidmore) represent a delicate balance be-
tween respect for Treasury’s role in interpreting the Code and 
the need for independent review of IRS enforcement actions, 
including Treasury interpretations of law.378 
Coverdale’s argument on this point should apply equally to 
specific authority Treasury regulations, yet he acknowledges 
the appropriateness of Chevron deference in such cases.379 Even 
if Coverdale were correct in his assessment that Congress was 
concerned with judicial review of general authority Treasury 
regulations when it created the Tax Court in 1924, its subse-
quent post-Chevron actions equating specific and general au-
thority Treasury regulations for penalty and Regulatory Flexi-
bility Act purposes suggest that Congress now feels differently. 
Regardless, a more thorough review of the Tax Court’s origins 
renders Coverdale’s assertion on this point doubtful. 
The BTA’s creation was not the genesis of judicial review of 
tax cases. Before Congress established the Board in 1924, ag-
grieved taxpayers could and did challenge IRS determinations 
in both the United States Court of Federal Claims and in the 
federal district courts.380 Without first paying the tax and suing 
 
 376. Unlike most areas of administrative law, tax has its own Article I 
court—the Tax Court. See 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 6 (1995) (listing the 
Article I courts). Taxpayers seeking to challenge IRS assessments may choose 
to pursue their cases in the Tax Court, in the United States Court of Federal 
Claims, which is another Article I court, or in United States Federal District 
Court, which is an Article III court. See SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1.05–.06. 
 377. Coverdale, supra note 122, at 86 (quoting Old Colony Trust v. Comm’r, 
279 U.S. 716, 721 (1929)). 
 378. Id. 
 379. See id. at 81–82. 
 380. See HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORI-
CAL ANALYSIS 28–35 (1979) (detailing pre-BTA judicial review). 
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for a refund,381 aggrieved taxpayers were limited to seeking 
nonadversarial, informal review of their tax assessments before 
the Committee on Appeals and Review. More often than not, 
this Committee merely negotiated settlements rather than re-
solving disputed issues; and its decisions were subject to review 
and amendment by the Solicitor of Internal Revenue as repre-
sentative of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.382 Recog-
nizing the suboptimality of this arrangement, Treasury pro-
posed establishing the BTA, outside the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue but still within the Treasury Department and under 
the direct supervision and control of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.383 Responding to complaints that Treasury’s proposal 
did not go far enough in separating administration and en-
forcement from the review function, Congress went a step fur-
ther and removed the BTA from Treasury altogether by giving 
the power to appoint the BTA’s members to the President with 
Senate advice and consent and by limiting their removal to 
cause.384 
In context, references to the BTA’s “independence” more 
likely refer to its organizational removal from the Department 
of Treasury rather than to the standard of review for legal 
questions before it. Noting the context and legislative history 
behind the BTA’s creation, Charles Hamel, the first Chairman, 
characterized the BTA’s role as judicial rather than legisla-
tive.385 The Board accordingly used the courts rather than 
other, more policy-oriented special tribunals as the model for 
the BTA’s procedural rules.386 Early BTA opinions convey the 
 
 381. See id. 
 382. See id. at 42–43 (describing the Committee on Appeals and Review). 
 383. See id. Whereas the Committee on Appeals and Review was located 
organizationally within the Bureau of Internal Revenue, under Treasury’s 
proposal, the BTA would have been located within the Treasury Department 
but separate from the Bureau, and the Secretary would have had the author-
ity to appoint members and to approve the Board’s procedural rules. See id. at 
52–53. The proposal at least implicitly gave the Secretary the power to remove 
Board members as well. See id. at 55. 
 384. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 900(b), 43 Stat. 336, 
337 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71–77 (2000)); see also DUBROFF, supra note 380, 
at 56–58, 66–67. 
 385. See Charles D. Hamel, United States Board of Tax Appeals, 13 GEO. 
L.J. 20, 24 (1924). In discussing the BTA’s role, Hamel particularly noted the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission as ex-
amples of other special tribunals within the federal government, but described 
them as having “a composite function to perform, both judicial and legislative,” 
as opposed to the BTA’s “purely judicial duty.” Id. 
 386. See id. 
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BTA’s adherence to the same deference principles applied by 
the Article III courts.387 
Additionally, Coverdale notes Treasury’s consistent posi-
tion that its general authority regulations are interpretative 
and thus exempt from the APA’s notice and comment proce-
dures. Although Coverdale takes at face value that Treasury in 
practice uses notice and comment because it wants to and not 
because it must, one could just as easily speculate that Treas-
ury follows the APA process because it recognizes that its posi-
tion is a dubious one. 
Many other agencies face challenges to their adherence to 
the APA’s procedural requirements.388 It is in Treasury’s inter-
est to assert the interpretative rule exemption as a potential 
legal argument against such challenges. Moreover, Treasury is 
inconsistent in distinguishing between its specific and general 
authority regulations where its institutional interests support a 
contrary position. Treasury blurs the distinction between the 
two regulation types by citing I.R.C. § 7805(a) as the primary 
authority for even regulations with arguable specific authority, 
then asserts the interpretative rule exemption for them all.389 
By claiming that exemption, Treasury theoretically concedes 
that its general authority regulations are not legally binding.390 
Yet Treasury treats specific and general authority regulations 
equally for underpayment penalty purposes while taking a 
more lenient position for less formal revenue rulings and no-
tices.391 Also at least post-Mead, the government regularly 
 
 387. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Comm’r, 26 BTA 277, 279 (1932) (describing spe-
cific authority Treasury regulations as, “if reasonable, hav[ing] the full force 
and effect of law” and citing Supreme Court cases for that proposition); Green 
River Distilling Co. v. Comm’r, 16 BTA 395, 399 (1929) (same); Appeal of Unif. 
Printing & Supply Co., 9 BTA 251, 254 (1927) (deferring to a regulatory defini-
tion of “business league” as “reasonable” particularly in light of legislative re-
enactment); Appeal of Gottlieb Bros., 1 BTA 684, 686–87 (1925) (noting the 
reasonableness and consistency of general authority Treasury regulation); see 
also Cronin v. Comm’r, 37 BTA 914, 920 (1938) (recognizing the applicability 
of Article III court deference principles); L.S. Donaldson Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 
12 BTA 271, 280 (1928) (same). 
 388. See, e.g., Transmission Access Policy Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 
729 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (challenging the adequacy of a notice-of-proposed rule-
making); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(same); Pers. Watercraft Indus. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Commerce, 48 F.3d 540, 542–
43 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (challenging an agency rule for failure to respond to com-
ments). 
 389. See discussion supra notes 30, 33 and accompanying text. 
 390. See discussion supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 391. See Treas. Reg. 1.6662-3 (2005). 
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claims in litigation that general authority Treasury regulations 
are Chevron-eligible, and thus asserts that such regulations 
carry the force and effect of law.392 
Treasury’s inconsistent and self-serving positions on the 
characterization and effect of its own regulations render its 
representations suspect. Accordingly, Treasury’s characteriza-
tion of its regulations should be heavily discounted for purposes 
of assessing Chevron’s applicability. 
Finally, Coverdale observes that Congress’s frequent tax 
legislation and the detail thereof suggest Congress’s preference 
for making tax policy itself rather than leaving such matters to 
Treasury.393 Of course, such a sentiment, if true, would elimi-
nate the need for I.R.C. § 7805(a). In fact, while Congress fre-
quently revisits some sections of the Code,394 it leaves others 
 
 392. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at 16, Cansino v. Comm’r, 94 
A.F.T.R.2d 2004-7256 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-73858); Brief for the Appellee at 
34, Gorospe v. Comm’r, 2003 WL 22754007 (9th Cir.) (No. 03-70250); Brief for 
Respondent at 46, Fowler v. Comm’r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 281 (2002) (No. 11885-
98); see also Reply Brief for Respondent at 301, Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. 
Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (Nos. 6163-03, 6164-03) (claiming both 
Chevron and National Muffler deference). But see Corrected Brief for the Ap-
pellee at 74–76, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’r, 311 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 
01-71584) (arguing for National Muffler deference only where appellant had 
conceded its applicability in the court below). 
 393. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 87. 
 394. For example, Congress has amended I.R.C. § 1 (2000), which estab-
lishes various tax rates, in eight of the last ten years, more often than not ex-
tensively, and in one year more than once. See Working Families Tax Relief 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §§ 101, 105, 402, 408, 118 Stat. 1166, 1167–
69, 1184–86, 1190–91 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 102–105, 107, 301–
303, 117 Stat. 752, 754–55, 758–64 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Holo-
caust Restitution Tax Fairness Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-358, 116 Stat. 
3015, 3015 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Economic Growth & Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 101, 302, 901, 115 Stat. 38, 
41–44, 54, 150 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Omnibus Consolidated 
and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, §§ 4002–03, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-906 to 2681-910 (1998) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 6005, 
6007, 112 Stat. 685, 796–811 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 311, 118 
Stat. 788, 831–36 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. § 1 
(2005)); Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 
§ 1704, 110 Stat. 1755, 1878–91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)). Congress revisited another provision, I.R.C. § 179 (2000), 
which allows certain taxpayers to deduct the cost of certain depreciable assets 
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untouched for years or even decades.395 In some Code sections, 
Congress provides great detail;396 but other Code sections are 
astonishingly vague, prompting extensive Treasury regulations 
to fill in the gaps.397 Congress changes some of the tax laws of-
ten in response to political and economic trends and events; but 
in areas that rouse less political interest, Congress clearly re-
lies upon Treasury to exercise its authority under I.R.C. 
§ 7805(a) to respond to changing circumstances and to fill un-
anticipated ambiguities. 
D. SUMMARY 
As per Mead, whether Chevron deference applies to Treas-
ury regulations depends upon whether Congress and the 
agency intended for them to carry the force and effect of law. It 
 
immediately rather than over time, three times during the same period. See 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 201, 118 Stat. 
1418, 1429 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Rec-
onciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 202, 117 Stat. 752, 757–58 (codi-
fied at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-188, § 1111, 110 Stat. 1755, 1758 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)). 
 395. Randolph Paul observed as early as 1939 that “Congress in tax legis-
lation usually hits only the high spots which are forced upon its attention by 
conspicuous judicial decisions or which are called to its attention by the 
Treasury and diligent taxpayers.” Paul, supra note 164, at 665. The Code has 
only grown in both size and complexity since Paul’s observation, rendering his 
observation even more accurate today. The rules governing “passive foreign 
investment companies” (PFICs) are illustrative of the problem. Congress 
adopted a complicated set of rules for taxing PFICs in 1986 and gave Treasury 
broad, specific authority to promulgate regulations interpreting the PFIC pro-
visions. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1235, 100 Stat. 
2085, 2566–76; see also I.R.C. § 1298(f) (2000) (redesignated from former I.R.C. 
§ 1297(d)). The PFIC rules contained many unanswered questions, gaps, and 
ambiguities; and while Treasury started to elaborate and clarify the PFIC 
rules with proposed regulations in 1992, those proposed regulations have been 
sharply criticized, and Treasury has never finalized them. See generally Kevin 
M. Cunningham, The PFIC Rules: The Case of Throwing the Baby Out With 
the Bathwater, 21 VA. TAX REV. 387 (2002). Notwithstanding these problems 
as well as dramatic increases in cross-border transactions and innovations in 
multinational business structures, Congress has made only a few, minor tech-
nical amendments to the PFIC regulations in the last twenty years. 
 396. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163 (2000) (providing for the deductibility of interest 
expense); id. §§ 901–908 (providing for foreign tax credit); id. §§ 1271–1275 
(covering original issue discount). 
 397. For example, I.R.C. § 61 (2000) defines gross income by listing several 
obvious sources but also stating the list is not exclusive and that gross income 
is “from whatever source derived.” Currently, Treasury has promulgated six-
teen final, five proposed, and one temporary regulation elaborating this sec-
tion. 
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is plausible that Congress originally intended that at least gen-
eral authority Treasury regulations should not be legally bind-
ing, particularly when one considers the understanding of the 
nondelegation doctrine common in the era in which Congress 
adopted the Code. Nevertheless, the nondelegation doctrine has 
long since passed as a serious obstacle to viewing general au-
thority Treasury regulations as legally binding. More recent, 
post-Chevron congressional action particularly with respect to 
the Code’s penalty provisions, but also regarding the Regula-
tory Flexibility Act, strongly support a conclusion that Con-
gress intends for all Treasury regulations—general and specific 
authority—to carry the force and effect of law. 
While Treasury continues to maintain its position that the 
general authority regulations are interpretative and not subject 
to APA notice and comment requirements, Treasury’s actions 
speak louder than its words: Treasury utilizes notice and com-
ment procedures in promulgating all of its regulations, consid-
ers itself bound by the interpretations advanced in those regu-
lations, and asserts the applicability of Chevron deference in 
litigation. Should any taxpayer actually challenge even a gen-
eral authority Treasury regulation on grounds that Treasury 
failed properly to satisfy the APA’s notice and comment re-
quirements, it seems a virtual certainty that the courts would 
conclude that all Treasury regulations are in fact legislative in 
character. To the extent that the Court has made clear the 
Chevron-eligibility of legislative regulations promulgated 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, such a characteriza-
tion should be dispositive for the question of Chevron’s applica-
bility. Once one strips away the tax-exceptionalist strain of the 
argument, the case for Chevron deference for Treasury regula-
tions is quite straight-forward. 
CONCLUSION 
Interpreting statutory ambiguity, at least as often as not, 
requires making policy choices. Where the Code is susceptible 
of more than one reasonable alternative answer, either Treas-
ury or the courts will be primarily responsible for choosing 
among them. Judicial deference principles ultimately attempt 
to strike a balance on that score between agencies like Treas-
ury and the courts. Chevron allows the courts to avoid interfer-
ing in policy matters and still police agency adherence to estab-
lished processes and keep agencies from going beyond the 
boundaries of congressionally delegated authority. 
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Skepticism of the motivations and abilities of regulatory 
agencies like Treasury in making such choices is not a new 
phenomenon. Chevron has its critics, as do Mead and 
Skidmore, on both doctrinal and normative grounds. Chevron 
reflects a very powerful pro-agency bias; and perhaps some op-
ponents are simply more trusting of the courts’ ability to choose 
between competing policies rendered permissible by ambiguous 
statutes. Ironically, notwithstanding the tax community’s resis-
tance to Chevron deference for Treasury regulations, few tax 
scholars or practitioners would assert that the courts do a very 
good job of interpreting the Code, particularly in more compli-
cated tax cases. Meanwhile, the fluidity of Skidmore’s multifac-
tor analysis renders that standard difficult to apply with con-
sistency, while ambiguities in the Court’s analysis in Mead 
leave the particulars of its application uncertain. 
Whatever the failings and pitfalls of Chevron, Mead, and 
Skidmore, acknowledging them is not the same thing as sup-
porting tax exceptionalism. There can be no doubt that Chev-
ron, Mead, and Skidmore today represent the dominant stan-
dard for evaluating agency interpretations of the statutes they 
administer. The claims of many in the tax community that tax 
should be different simply do not bear out when examined in 
the broader, comparative context. Doctrinally, the pre-Chevron 
history of the Court’s deference jurisprudence tracks quite 
closely between tax and non-tax cases, as does the scholarly 
analysis thereof. It is only in the post-Chevron era that the no-
tion of tax exceptionalism really began to take hold, admittedly 
assisted by muddled and inconclusive rhetoric from the Court. 
Unsettled as the doctrine may now be, however, the normative 
case for distinguishing tax from non-tax cases simply fails 
when tax and non-tax practices are laid side by side. The clear 
intent of Congress as well as Treasury is that general and spe-
cific authority Treasury regulations both are legally binding on 
taxpayers and the government alike. Whatever Mead may 
mean in more marginal cases, Treasury regulations present an 
easy case for Chevron deference. 
